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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1959, the Nebraska Law Review published the remarkable re-
sults of an experiment on jury instructions.' Researchers with the
University of Chicago Jury Project had discovered that when subjects
in simulated jury trials were admonished to disregard evidence of in-
surance, they did the exact opposite of what they were told. The ad-
monition did not reduce the impact of this inadmissible evidence;2 it
increased the prejudicial effect.3 Subsequent studies confirm that ju-
rors appear to be unable or unwilling to follow this kind of
instruction.4
In Carter v. Kentucky,5 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
put these data to use. It had to decide whether the jury should be
admonished to disregard the fact that a defendant had not testified.
Although jurors "may well draw adverse inferences from a defend-
ant's silence" unless some steps are taken to prevent it,6 the research
by psychologists demonstrates that instructing jurors to disregard the
silence will not accomplish the task. The research was ignored. In-
stead, the Supreme Court asserted that an admonition was a "power-
ful tool" with "unique power . . . to reduce . . . speculation to a
minimum."7 The Justices apparently believed that an admonition
would actually "remove from the jury's deliberations any [negative]
inferences."8
Is Carter simply an isolated case of bad decision-making, or is it
representative of a wide-spread problem of ignorance concerning jury
1. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959).
2. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 411 (evidence of liability insurance not admissible upon the
issue of whether the defendant acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully).
3. Broeder, supra note 1, at 753-54 (verdicts averaged $33,000 if there was no evi-
dence of insurance, $37,000 when insurance was mentioned, and $46,000 when ju-
rors were told to disregard it). See also Kalven, A Report on the Jury Project of
the University of Chicago Law School, 24 INs. COUNsEL J. 368, 377-78 (1958)(re-
porting same results).
4. See Oros & Elman, Impact of Judge's Instructions Upon Jurors' Decisions: The
Cautionary Charge in Rape Trials, 10 REPRESENTATIVE REs. IN Soc. PsYCHOLOGY
28, 32 (1979); Sue, Smith & Caldwell, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the
Decisions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL-
OGY 345,350-51 (1973); Wolf & Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and
Level of Judicial Admonishment to Disregard on the Judgments of Mock Jurors,
7 J. APPLIED Soc. PsYCHOLOGY 205, 213-16 (1977). See also Thompson, Fong &
Rosenhan, Inadmissible Evidence and Juror Verdicts, 40 J. PERSONALIT & Soc.
PsYCHoLOGY 453, 457-58 (1981).
5. 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
6. Id. at 301.
7. Id. at 303.
8. Id. at 301 (quoting Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 340 (1978)).
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instructions? This question strikes at the heart of the legitimacy of
our current litigation system. As the Supreme Court has noted, our
jury trial system depends on the "crucial assumption... that juries
will follow the instructions given them by the trial judge."9 The pur-
pose of this Article is to explore that assumption and its ramifications.
Part one classifies and describes the main types of jury instructions.
Part two synthesizes the psycholegal research concerning the effec-
tiveness (or, more commonly, the ineffectiveness) of various jury in-
struction practices. Part three uses this literature to critically
examine jury instruction procedures now in use. Part four makes
some suggestions for law reform that could improve the jury instruc-
tion process and thus restore legitimacy to our system of trial by jury.
II. TYPES OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Much confusion and ambiguity exists in the classification and no-
menclature of jury instructions. They are referred to somewhat inter-
changeably as instructions, admonitions, and charges.1O They are
grouped into various vaguely defined categories, such as explanatory,
cautionary, limiting, written, oral, verdict-directing, curative, pattern
or preliminary. Some have colorful names like the "dynamite
charge."" At times, the taxonomy of instructions can assume signifi-
cant proportions. In James v. Kentucky,12 for example, whether a de-
fendant was procedurally barred from raising a constitutional issue on
appeal depended on the distinction between an "admonition" and an
"instruction" under Kentucky law. Both the Kentucky and United
States Supreme Courts devoted their opinions to discussing the
amount of difference between the two, agreeing that the defendant's
ability to press his appeal depended on the answer.'3
In most jurisdictions, instructions are classified according to the
9. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979), cited with approval in Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983). See also Opperv. United States, 348 U.S.
84, 95 (1954)("Our theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury to follow
instructions").
10. Cf. Note, Jury Instructions v. Jury Charges, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 555, 555-56
(1980)(drawing distinction between instruction and charge).
11. Also called a "hammer" or "Allen" charge, the "dynamite charge" is based on
United States v. Allen, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), in which the Court approved an in-
struction given to a deadlocked jury urging them to try to overcome their differ-
ences and reach a verdict.
12. 466 U.S. 341 (1984).
13. At trial, the defendant had requested a jury "admonition" rather than an instruc-
tion. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that there was a vast difference be-
tween the two and the defendant had waived the right to appeal by asking for the
wrong remedy. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged the right of a
state to define its law of jury instructions but concluded that with such specificity,
"the substantive distinction between admonitions and instructions [was] not al-
ways clear or closely hewn to." Id. at 345-49.
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time during trial at which they are given: preliminary and mid-trial
instructions, the concluding charge, and mid-deliberation instruc-
tions.14 The problem with this approach is that the same instruction
may be given at various times. For example, the instruction on burden
of proof usually is included in both preliminary instructions and the
concluding charge; limiting instructions may be given mid-trial and re-
peated in the charge. Therefore, for purposes of this Article, instruc-
tions will be classified into two main categories according to their
purpose: 1) charging instructions that tell jurors about the law and
procedure they are supposed to follow; and 2) admonitions that warn
jurors that they should not consider some kinds of information in ar-
riving at a verdict.
A. Charging Instructions
The most important instructions are those that make up the jury
charge. Charging instructions explain the jury's role, describe rele-
vant procedural and substantive law, and provide suggestions on how
to organize deliberations and evaluate evidence. In almost every juris-
diction, charging instructions now come exclusively from books of ap-
proved pattern jury instructions.1 5 They traditionally are given at the
end of the trial, either before or after closing arguments,16 although
some judges also give the jury an abbreviated charge at the beginning
of the trial.17
Four varieties of instructions appear in the jury charge. First, gen-
eral introductory instructions describe the jurors' duties. Typically,
these instructions inform jurors that they must accept the law from
the court but determine the facts for themselves, treat the charge as a
whole, base their verdict only on the evidence, evaluate the credibility
of witnesses, recognize that the attorneys' arguments are not evidence,
act impartially, and reach a unanimous verdict.1 8 Some portions of the
14. See, e.g., E. DEvrr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
(3d ed. 1977); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS (1982).
15. See R. NIELAND, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: A CRITICAL LOOK AT A MODERN
MOVEMENT TO IMPROVE THE JURY SYSTEM 10 (1979)(as of 1980, 43 states had pat-
tern jury instructions available); Perlman, Pattern Jury Instructions: The Appli-
cation of Social Science Research, 65 NEB. L. REv. 520, 526-28 (1986) (discussing
the history of jury instructions and the use of pattern instructions as a 20th cen-
tury phenomenon).
16. See Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CALIF.
L. REv. 731, 755-56 (1981).
17. See id.; Steele & Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to
Communicate, 67 N.C.L. REV. 77, 77-78 (1988). See, e.g., MICH. CT. R.
2.516(B)(preliminary instructions required explaining duties of jurors and law ap-
plicable to the case).
18. See D. AARONSON, MARYLAND CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND COMMENTARY
§§ 1.01-1.09 (2d ed. 1988); FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL
[Vol. 69:71
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jury-function instructions, such as the caution not to discuss the case
with anyone or listen to news reports of the trial, may be repeated
several times throughout the trial.19
Second, jurors are instructed in the rudiments of procedure. For
example:
The State has the burden of proving, based upon the evidence introduced
at trial, every fact necessary to convict the defendant of the crime with which
he is charged. This burden remains with the State throughout the trial. The
defendant does not have the burden of proving his innocence or of producing
any evidence. If you are not convinced that the State has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt each and every element of the offense with which the de-
fendant is charged you must find the defendant not guilty. On the other hand,
if you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the State has
proved each of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you should find the defendant guilty.
Every defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. You should
not assume that the defendant is guilty because he is on trial. The presump-
tion of innocence remains with the defendant throughout the trial unless and
until he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt....
Reasonable doubt, as the name implies, is a doubt based on reason, a doubt
for which you can give a reason. It is not a fanciful doubt, nor a whimsical
doubt, nor a doubt based on conjecture. It is such a doubt as would cause a
juror, after a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, to be so
undecided that the juror cannot say that he or she has an abiding conviction of
the defendant's guilt.20
Third, jurors are instructed about the elements of the relevant sub-
stantive law. For example:
[Proximate cause is] a cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence,
produces damage and without which the damage would not have occurred.21
A motorist who is making a left-hand turn is required by law to exercise
ordinary care to ensure that such movement can be made without endanger-
ing others. In addition to signalling his intention, he must yield the right-of-
way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction. He must also
yield the right-of-way to any oncoming traffic which is so close as to constitute
a hazard.22
Fourth, cautionary instructions point out potential problems with
certain kinds of evidence and suggest methods the jury can use to
evaluate their reliability. The leading example concerns eyewitness
evidence.
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or impression by the wit-
ness. Its value depends on the opportunity the witness had to observe the
offender at the time of the offense and to make a reliable identification later.
CAsES §§ 2.05 (1981); VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL §§ 2.050
(Repl. ed. 1985 & 1988 Supp.).
19. See, e.g., E. DEvrIr & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 14, § 5.07.
20. D. AARONSON, supra note 18, at §§ 1.02-1.04 (redundant and bracketed portions
omitted).
21. ARKANSAs MODEL JURY INsTRUCTIoNs-CIVIL § 501 (3d ed. 1989).
22. G. DoumwArIE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN AUTOMOBILE NEGLIGENCE AcTIONs 249
(1986).
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In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider
the following.
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity and an adequate
opportunity to observe the offender?
Whether the witness had an opportunity to observe the offender at the
time of the offense will be affected by such matters as how long or short a
time was available, how far or close the witness was, how good were lighting
conditions, whether the witness had had [sic] occasion to see or know the per-
son in the past.
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by the witness subse-
quent to the offense was the product of his own recollection? You may take
into account both the strength of the identification, and the circumstances
under which the identification was made.
If the identification by the witness may have been influenced by the cir-
cumstances under which the defendant was presented to him for identifica-
tion, you should scrutinize the identification with great care. You may also
consider the length of time that lapsed between the occurrence of the crime
and the next opportunity of the witness to see [the] defendant, as a factor
bearing on the reliability of the identification.
(3) You may take into account any occasions in which the witness failed to
make an identification of defendant, or made an identification that was incon-
sistent with his identification at trial.
(4) Finally, you must consider the credibility of each identification witness
in the same way as any other witness, consider whether he is truthful, and
consider whether he had the capacity and opportunity to make a reliable ob-
servation on the matter covered in his testimony.
2 3
Cautionary instructions also are given in conjunction with accom-
plice testimony,2 4 a defendant's confession that may have been co-
erced by police "persuasion,"25 testimony by previously hypnotized
witnesses, 26 and arguments by attorneys that pain and suffering dam-
ages can be calculated according to a per diem mathematical
formula.27
B. Admonitions
Admonitions are given spontaneously in an effort to prevent jurors
from misusing potentially prejudicial information. They come in two
main varieties: admonitions that jurors must completely disregard in-
formation and instructions to limit their use of evidence. Judges gen-
erally admonish the jury at the time the information is disclosed,
23. United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(bracketed portions
omitted). Cf. Commonwealth v. Yarris, 519 Pa. 571, 549 A.2d 513 (1988)(if judge
believes eyewitness is reliable, no instruction is needed).
24. See, e.g., People v. Allen, 45 Cal. 3d 1268, 756 P.2d 221, 248 Cal Rptr. 834 (1988);
Mims v. United States, 254 F.2d 654, 655 (9th Cir. 1958).
25. E.g., Conner v. State, 106 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1958). Cf. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.
560, 566-68 (1958)(constitutional limits to using coerced confession).
26. E.g., State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St. 3d 48, 54-55, 529 N.E.2d 898, 905-06 (1988).
27. See Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82,138 A.2d 713 (1958). See also People v. Boyde, 46
Cal. 3d 212, 254-55, 758 P.2d 25, 49 (1988)(general cautionary instruction that the
arguments of the attorneys are not evidence).
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although a reminder may also be given in the court's final charge. Ad-
monitions are often misleadingly called "curative" instructions.
An admonition to disregard information warns jurors not to con-
sider it for any purpose whatsoever. For example, a court might tell
the jury: "The defendant is not compelled to testify and the fact that
he does not [testify] cannot be used as an inference of guilt and should
not prejudice him in any way."28 This kind of admonition commonly
is used after a witness gives testimony that violates the rules of evi-
dence, e.g., by disclosing that a defendant has a criminal record,29 men-
tioning polygraph tests,3 0 or disclosing that a civil defendant had
offered to settle the case.31 Judges also admonish jurors to disregard
improper remarks and comments by attorneys that violate the rules of
trial law, e.g., mentioning that the defendant has insurance,32 stating a
personal opinion about the merits of the case3 3 or making blatant ap-
peals to sympathy.34 Occasionally, a judge may admonish the jury to
disregard the judge's own improper conduct,3 5 or the conduct of out-
siders not involved in the trial.36
Limiting instructions admonish jurors not to consider evidence for
a particular purpose, although it may be considered on other issues.
For example, a judge might tell the jury:
The evidence you are about to receive concerning evidence of other crimes
allegedly committed by the defendant will be considered by you for the lim-
ited purpose of proving [motive, opportunity, intent, etc.] on the part of the
defendant and you shall consider it only as it relates to those issues.3 7
Limiting instructions are commonly given when the rules of evi-
dence specify that otherwise prohibited evidence is admissible for a
limited purpose. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) pro-
28. This is the instruction requested by the defense in Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S.
288, 294 (1981). See supr note 13 and accompanying text.
29. See Gowin v. State, 760 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)(in driving under the influ-
ence prosecution, witness mentioned that defendant had prior arrests for drunk
driving); Martin v. State, 528 N.E.2d 461 (Ind. 1988)(police officer testified he be-
lieved defendant had been involved in a series of robberies).
30, See, eg., Lusby v. State, 217 Md. 191, 141 A.2d 893 (1958).
31. See, eg., Streeter v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 533 So. 2d 54, 62 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
32. See, eg., Tellefson v. Key Sys. Trans. Lines, 158 Cal. App. 2d 243, 322 P.2d 469
(1958).
33, See, ag., Martin v. State, 98 Ga. App. 136, 105 S.E.2d 250 (1958).
34. See, eg., State v. Mead, 544 A.2d 1146 (R.I. 1988).
35. See Montgomery v. State, 760 S.W.2d 323, 327-29 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)(judge im-
properly informed jury about parole laws); Jackson v. State, 756 S.W.2d 82 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1988)(judge suggested defendant's case was weak); Maulding v. State, 296
Ark. 328, 757 S.W.2d 916 (1988)(judge criticized defense attorney).
36. See, eg., Stahl v. State 749 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)(victim's mother
cried out from audience, "May he burn in hell, oh my baby"). See also D. AARON-
SON, supra note 18, at § 1.11(b)(disregard newspaper, television and radio
reports).
37. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRMNAL CASES 50 (1981).
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vides that evidence of a defendant's prior criminal acts are not admis-
sible to prove his culpability, but may be used for the limited purpose
of proving identity, low credibility, or a state of mind, such as intent,
knowledge, notice, and absence of mistake.38 Similarly, limiting in-
structions may accompany the introduction of hearsay evidence of-
fered not to prove the truth of the facts asserted, but to show that the
person who heard them was put on notice3 9 or to impeach as prior
inconsistent statements. 40
Limiting instructions also are used when multiple defendants or
multiple offenses are joined into a single trial.41 If evidence is admissi-
ble against one defendant but inadmissible against the other, judges
may admonish the jurors to limit their use of the evidence accordingly.
For example, a confession is admissible against the person who made
it, but inadmissible hearsay if offered against other parties.42 In joint
trials involving confessions, the judge usually will instruct the jurors
to consider each confession only against the person who made it, even
if it incriminates others.43 Similarly, when one defendant is charged
with multiple offenses or sued under different causes of action, evi-
dence may be admissible to prove one charge but legally inadmissible
on the other. For example, evidence of subsequent safety measures
are inadmissible in negligence cases, but may be admissible in prod-
ucts liability trials. If a defendant manufacturer is being sued on both
grounds, a judge is likely to use a limiting instruction rather than or-
der inefficient separate trials.44
38. See United States v. Dunn, 841 F.2d 1026 (10th Cir. 1988)(criminal convictions
were admissible for limited purpose of impeaching defendant's credibility);
United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 1176-77 (10th Cir. 1988)(although evidence
that rape defendant had previously committed sexual assault was not admissible
to prove he committed rape, it was admissible to prove his intent); Howard v.
State, 549 A.2d 692 (Del. 1988)(evidence that defendant purchased narcotics was
admissible only to show his motive for forging check).
39. See State v. Curry, 436 N.W.2d 371 (Ia. 1988).
40. See D. AARONSON, supra note 18, at § 2.08 ("Prior statements are admitted into
evidence solely for your consideration in evaluating the credibility, or worthiness
of belief, of the witness. If you find the prior statements to be inconsistent, you
may consider such statements only in your evaluation of the truth of the witness'
present testimony in court. You must not consider the prior statements as estab-
lishing the truth of any fact contained in that statement").
41. See, e.g., FED. R. CRiM. P. 8.
42. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
43. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987); United States v. Gordon, 253
F.2d 177, 182-83 (7th Cir. 1958); Durkin v. Equine Clinics Inc., 376 Pa. Super. 557,
546 A.2d 665 (1988). Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968)(limiting
instruction may not be adequate if incriminatory nature of confession makes it
unlikely jury can, in fact, adhere to instruction).
44. See Enterprise Prod. Co. v. Sanderson, 759 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
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Ill. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In the thirty years since the University of Chicago Jury Project
first demonstrated that jurors are either unwilling or unable to obey
some kinds of instructions, psychologists have conducted extensive re-
search on a wide range of related issues.
A. Empirical Research About Charging Instructions
The empirical research by psychologists on pattern instructions
that make up the jury charge has focused on three topics: their gen-
eral comprehensibility, the effect of varying the timing at which they
are given, and the impact of the number of times the instructions are
repeated.
1. General Comprehensibility
Several researchers have investigated whether jurors understand
charging instructions on the substantive law, evidence, and burdens of
proof. They all reach the same conclusion: typical pattern jury in-
structions, drafted by lawyers in an effort to be legally precise, are
incomprehensible to jurors.45 Forston found that after hearing in-
structions, 80% of his subjects still did not understand basic rules of
evidence and the burden of proof.4 6 Strawn and Buchanan found that
after instructions, 43% of jurors still did not believe that circumstan-
tial evidence was valid, 50% did not understand the presumption of
innocence, and 23% thought that if they had doubts because the evi-
dence was evenly balanced, the defendant should be convicted.47
Elwork, Sales and Alfini found that after they had been charged, 44%
of their subjects still could not correctly answer more than half of a
legal comprehension questionnaire. 48
Jurors' abilities to understand pattern instructions vary with the
subject matter of the instruction. Severance and Loftus found that
after hearing an instruction on reasonable doubt, many jurors showed
45. Cf. Reed, Jury Simulation: The Impact of Judge's Instructions and Attorney
Tactics on Decisionmaking, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRMNoLOGY 68, 71-72
(1980) (although jurors did not understand their instructions, the instructions had
an effect on their verdicts). For a marvelous collection of Texas appellate cases
illustrating various juror misunderstandings of their instructions, see Steele &
Thornburg, supra note 17, at 80-83.
46. Forston, Justice, Jurors and Judges' Instructions, 12 JUDG s J. 68 (1973)(using
Iowa jurors).
47. Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDIcATURE 478,
480-81 (1976)(using Florida jurors). See also Taylor, Buchanan, Pryor & Strawn,
Avoiding the Legal Tower of Babel, 19 JUDGES J., Summer 1980, at 10,15 (summa-
rizes communication literature and concludes that old instruction practices are
too complex and abstract for jurors to understand).
48. Elwork, Sales & Alfini, Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or In Light of
It 1 LAW & HUM. BExAv. 163, 170-71 (1977)(using Nebraska subjects).
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better understanding of the concept than before, although 26% still
did not understand it.49 Similarly, introductory instructions signifi-
cantly helped their subjects understand their general roles and duties
as jurors, but a substantial number still made errors on a comprehen-
sion test.5 0 However, a mens rea instruction on intent did not improve
their subjects' comprehension of that element of the substantive law.51
Borgida and Park discovered that jurors could understand an instruc-
tion on the subjective test for entrapment that focuses on the defend-
ant's predisposition to commit an offense, but could not understand an
instruction explaining the objective test that focuses on government
conduct.52 These studies, together with research by Elwork, Sales
and Alfini,ss suggest that although pattern instructions may be effec-
tive in reminding jurors of concepts with which they already are gen-
erally familiar, they do not improve comprehension of new, difficult,
or counter-intuitive laws.
Much of the empirical research has focused on how to improve that
comprehension. Researchers assert that the attempt to make them
legally precise54 has resulted in instructions so full of jargon and modi-
fying clauses that they are not understandable. There is general con-
sensus that the first step should be to rewrite pattern instructions
using simpler language. Psycholinguists suggest that comprehension
49. Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply
Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 153, 180 (1982)(32.1% error
rate reduced to 26.2% error rate; F(2,210) = 4.03, p< .02). See also Kerr, Atkin,
Stasser, Meek, Holt, & Davis, Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. Effects of Con-
cept Definition and Assigned Decision Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34
J. PERSONALrry & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 282,287 (1976)(varying the definition of bur-
den of proof contained in the instructions affected both individual and group ver-
dicts; using a more stringent standard produced more not-guilty verdicts than a
laxer burden).
50. Severance & Loftus, supra note 49, at 181 (27.5% error rate reduced to 20.8%
error rate; F(2,210) = 5.29, p<.006).
51. Id. at 180-81 (39.1% and 35.2% error rates not statistically significant difference;
F(2,210) = 0.87, p = n.s.).
52. Borgida & Park, The Entrapment Defense" Juror Comprehension and Decision
Making, 12 LAw & HuM. BEHAv. 19, 28 (1988).
53. Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 48, at 175-76 (testing whether jurors under-
stood concept of contributory negligence, i.e., if both parties were at fault, the
defendant wins; pattern instructions were not effective in helping jurors translate
factual situation of mutual fault into a correct legal decision that the defendant
wins).
54. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL BOOK OF APPROVED JURY
INSTRUCTIONs 44 (1950)('The one thing an instruction must do above all else is
correctly state that law. This is true regardless of who is capable of understand-
ing it")(emphasis supplied), cited in Severance, Greene & Loftus, Toward Crimi-
nal Jury Instructions That Jurors Can Understand, 75 J. CmIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 198, 201 (1984). Cf. Perlman, supra note 15, at 535 (defending the
use of legal jargon because instructions are addressed not only to jurors, but also
to lawyers and judges where precision is necessary).
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would be improved if instructions were written along the following
guidelines:
1. Eliminate nominalizations (making nouns out of verbs)
and substitute verb forms; e.g., changing "an offer of evidence"
to "items were offered into evidence." 56
2. Replace the prepositional phrase "as to" with "about;" e.g.,
changing "you must not speculate as to what the answer might
have been" to '"ou must not speculate about what the answer
might have been."56
3. Relocate prepositional phrases so they do not interrupt a
sentence; e.g., avoiding sentences such as "proximate cause is a
cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, produces
the injury. "57
4. Replace words that are difficult to understand with simple
ones; e.g., changing "agent's negligence is imputed to plaintiff"
to "agent's negligence transfers to plaintiff."58
5. Avoid multiple negatives in a sentence; e.g., "innocent mis-
recollection is not uncommon."59
6. Use the active rather than passive voice; e.g., changing "no
emphasis is intended by me" to "I do not intend to
emphasize."60
7. Avoid "whiz" deletions (omitting words "which is"); e.g.,
by changing "statements of counsel" to "statements which are
made by counsel."S1
8. Reduce long lists of words with similar meanings to only
one or two; e.g., shortening "knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education" to "training or experience."62
9. Organize instructions into meaningful discourse structures
that avoid connecting unrelated ideas in ways that make them
seem related.63
55. Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable A Psycholinguis-
tic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1306, 1321-22, 1336 (1979)(em-
phasis supplied).
56. Id. at 1322, 1336 (emphasis supplied).
57. Id. at 1323, 1336 (emphasis supplied).
58. Id. at 1324,1336 (emphasis supplied). See also A. ELwoRK, B. SALES, & J. ALFINi,
MAKING JURY INsTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE 176-80 (1982)(avoid ambiguous
homonyms like "information" when repeating a concept, use the same word
rather than a synonym and use positive words like "rude" rather than antonyms
such as "impolite").
59. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 55, at 1324-25, 1337 (emphasis supplied); A.
ELwoRc, B. SALEs & J. ALFn, supra note 58, at 172-73.
60. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 55, at 1325-26,1337-38; A. ELwoRK, B. SALES & J.
ALFINI, supra note 58, at 175-76.
61. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 55, at 1323, 1338 (emphasis supplied).
62. Id. at 1326, 1338.
63. Id. at 1326-27, 1338-39 (eg., change "If in these instructions any rule is repeated,
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10. Avoid embedding subordinate clauses in sentences; e.g.,
"you must not speculate to be true any insinuation suggested
by a question asked a witness."64
Experiments with rewritten instructions consistently show improved
juror comprehension of rules of law.65
Rewriting is not a panacea, however. Even after receiving rewrit-
ten instructions, subjects in these experiments still showed up to 75%
error rates on comprehension tests.66 Nor do rewritten instructions
significantly improve comprehension in all situations. Elwork, Sales
and Alfini found that rewritten instructions did not help jurors' accu-
rately translate factual decisions into legal ones where the concepts
were familiar. For example, when jurors were asked to decide
whether speeding constituted legal negligence, the type of instruction
had no effect. This may be because jurors are already familiar with
the rules of road and have preconceptions about whether speeding is
negligent. However, when a legal concept is outside the jurors' exper-
iences and contrary to common sense, such as the old contributory
negligence rule, revised instructions can produce a dramatic increase
in legally correct decisions.6 7
The research suggests that complex language and bad grammar are
not the only factors making communication difficult. The abstract na-
ture of many instructions also interferes with comprehension.
Apparently in an effort to avoid commenting on the evidence, Ameri-
can judges tend not to place legal concepts in the context of the actual
facts of the case.68 Psychologists have demonstrated that knowledge
no emphasis thereon is intended; for that reason, you must consider these instruc-
tions as a whole; the order in which they are given has no significance" to "There
are three things you must keep in mind: first, repetition of an instruction does
not mean I am emphasizing it; second, you must consider all the instructions to-
gether; and third, the order has no significance"). See also A. ELWORK, B. SALES
& J. ALFINI, supra note 58, at 149-67 (other organizational principles).
64. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 55, at 1324-25, 1337; A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J.
ALFINI, supra note 58, at 168-72.
65. Elwork, Sales and Alfini, supra note 48, at 175, found that rewritten instructions
had a significant impact on jurors' understanding of legal concepts based on
scores on a comprehension test (F (1,112) = 9.50, p<.005 ). See also Charrow &
Charrow, supra note 55, at 1331 (improved comprehension for rewritten instruc-
tions); Severance & Loftus, supra note 49, at 183-95 (revised instructions pro-
duced lower error rate on comprehension test and more accurate applications of
law in hypothetical situations than did pattern instructions); Steele & Thornburg,
supra note 17, at 90 (comprehension improved).
66. See Severance & Loftus, supra note 49, at 190, Table 6 (revised instruction on
intent, 24.9% error rate; revised instruction on reasonable doubt, 20.2% error
rate); Steele & Thornburg, supra note 17, at 90-92 (75% failure rate for subjects
asked an open-ended question to paraphrase rewritten instructions).
67. Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 48, at 176 (pattern instruction produced 38%
error rate, revised instruction only 13% error rate).
68. Schwarzer, supra note 16, at 741; Steele & Thornburg, supra note 17, at 101-03.
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of context is necessary for effective comprehension of prose
passages. 69 Instructions therefore would be better understood if
judges would provide context, refer to the actual evidence, use exam-
ples from the real world, and use the names of persons, places and
things rather than generic terms such as "plaintiff."70 On the other
hand, sentence length appears to have little effect on
comprehension.1
One other obvious problem with traditional instructions is that
they are given orally, rather than in writing. It undoubtedly is diffi-
cult for jurors to recall several hours of oral instructions. 72 Would
providing written instructions improve comprehension? Some judges
and psychologists think so,7 3 but apparently the issue has not been the
subject of empirical investigation. 74
2. Timing and Repetition
A number of legal commentators believe that one of the reasons
jurors do not understand and follow their instructions is that they do
not hear them until the end of the trial.75 Jurors might do a better job
if they heard the instructions at the beginning. This assertion finds
some support in two psychological theories. Encoding theory predicts
that if the charge were given at the start, jurors could more easily
identify and focus on the central disputes during the presentation of
69. Bransford & Johnson, Contertual Prerequisites for Understanding: Some Inves-
tigations of Comprehension and Recall, 11 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL
BEHAV. 717 (1972).
70. See A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALFiNi, supra note 58, at 178; Severance, Greene &
Loftus, supra note 54, at 202, 207-08; Strawn, Buchanan, Pryor & Taylor, Reach-
ing a Verdic Step By Step, 60 JUDICATURE 383, 387 (1977).
71. A. ELWORK, B. SALES, & J. ALriN, supra note 58, at 167-68; Charrow & Charrow,
supra note 55, at 1319-20.
72. See Schwarzer, supra note 16 (federal judge suggests intuitively that instructions
should be kept to a maximum of 20-30 minutes).
73. See Weltner, Why the Jury Doesn't Understand the Judge's Instructions, 18
JUDGES J., Spring 1979, at 18, 21 (conclusion based on interviews with jurors).
74. See A. ELWORK, B. SALES, & J. ALFINI, supra note 58, at 18-20 (fact that written
instructions would be more easily understood than oral is so obvious from re-
search on educational and cognitive psychology that no experiment with jury in-
structions is necessary).
75. See Forston, supra note 46. See also Avakian, Let's Learn to Instruct the Jury, 18
JUDGES J., Summer 1979, at 40 (judge's personal experience is that instructing
before, during, and after trial improves juror comprehension); Hunter, Law in
the Jury Room, 2 Omo ST. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1935)(intuition says that instruction at end
of long day of listening is not likely to be effective); Prettyman, Jury Instruc-
tions-First or Last?, 46 A.B.A. J. 1066, 1066 (1960)(makes intuitive sense to tell
jurors the rules of the game at the beginning); Weltner, supra note 73, at 20
(based on juror interviews, judge recommends that instructions be given at the
beginning of the trial); Note, Memory, Magic and Myth.- the Timing of Jury In-
structions, 59 OI. L. REv. 451, 461 (1981)(concludes that Oregon should adopt the
practice of giving preliminary instructions).
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evidence. 76 Information integration theory holds that jurors arrive at
judgments by weighing all pieces of information, including instruc-
tions, after each item has been assigned some scale value along a guilt-
innocence dimension.77 Because of ordering effects, salient informa-
tion received early in the trial may be given the greatest weight.78
Kassin and Wrightsman have found mild empirical support for a
beneficial preliminary instruction effect. They discovered that giving
subjects an instruction on the burden of proof at the end of trial had
no impact on their verdicts compared to no instruction at all, but giv-
ing the instruction at the beginning of trial did affect verdicts,
although the effect was marginal.79 They hypothesized that jurors de-
cide how they will vote at some time before the end of the trial.8 0
Therefore, instructions given at the end may come too late to have a
meaningful impact on juror decisions.
However, other researchers have found that giving preliminary in-
structions either have no effect or decrease comprehension. Cruse
and Brown gave subjects a full set of standard instructions and found
that it made no difference on verdicts whether they were given before
or after the evidences1 Greene and Loftus tested limiting instructions
in joined criminal trials, with no difference in result regardless of
when the instruction was given.82 Elwork, Sales and Alfini found that
instructions given at the end of the trial actually produced better re-
sults on a comprehension test than if they were given in the beginning,
but they did not measure effect on verdicts.8 3
The one point upon which all researchers are agreed is that repeat-
ing the instructions two or more times aids comprehension and im-
proves the accuracy of verdicts. Elwork, Sales and Alfini found that
76. See Cruse & Browne, Reasoning in a Jury Trial" The Influence of Instructions,
114 J. GEN. PsYCHOLoGY 129, 132-33 (1987).
77. See Kaplan & Kemmerick, Juror Judgment as Infrmation Integration: Com-
bining Evidential and Nonevidential I?formation, 30 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 493, 493 (1974).
78. See id.; Kassin & Wrightsman, On the Requirements of Proof- The Timing of
Judicial Instruction and Mock Juror Verdicts, 37 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSY-
CHOLOGY 1877, 1884 (1979).
79. Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 78, at 1880-81, 1884 (instructions given before
evidence had marginally significant effect on verdict compared to no instructions
(F(2,101) = 2.90, p<.06), instructions given after evidence had no effect com-
pared to no instructions).
80. See also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERicAN JuRY 488-89 (1966)(jurors make
up minds before deliberations).
81. Cruse & Browne, supra note 76, at 131-32.
82. Greene & Loftus, When Crimes Are Joined at Trial, 9 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 193,
203-04 (1985)(result may have been caused by the combination of general incom-
prehensibility of instructions and jurors' tendencies to ignore admonitions of this
sort).
83. Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 48, at 177-78 (although scores of 7.5 and 8.05
are not statistically significant, they are in predicted direction).
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subjects who had been instructed twice had higher scores on compre-
hension tests.8 4 Cruse and Browne found that giving a full set of stan-
dard instructions twice significantly increased verdict accuracy.8 5
Forston suggests that ideally instructions should be given not only at
the beginning, but also throughout the trial as appropriate.8 6
3. Cautionary Instructions
Four studies that specifically focused on the effect of cautionary
instructions yielded mixed results. Kassin and Wrightsman tested
whether a cautionary instruction concerning coerced confessions
would help jurors determine the reliability of the confession. They
varied both the level of coercion surrounding the extraction of the
confession and the giving or withholding of two kinds of cautionary
instructions. In two experiments, the cautionary instructions had no
measurable effect, either on the verdict-or on subjects' judgments as to
whether the confession was voluntary.87 Katzev and Wishart mea-
sured the effect of cautionary instructions concerning problems with
eyewitnesses. They found that giving the instruction had a marginal
effect, but not enough to be statistically significant.8 8 Greene also ob-
tained marginal results when she tested the traditional eyewitness in-
struction. In her experiments, the instruction had no overall effect,
although it tended to affect the number of hung juries.8 9 Oros and
Elman did find that giving a cautionary instruction concerning rape
victims significantly affected jurors' decisions.90 However, the cau-
tionary instruction that the charge of rape is easy to make and difficult
to disprove9 ' is no longer used.92
84. Id at 177 (not quite statistically significant; F(2,112) = 2.07, p<.l).
85. Cruse & Brovne, supra note 76, at 131-32 (Chi-square (1,160) = 3.9, p<.05).
86. Forston, Sense and Non-sens" Jury Trial Communication, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV.
601, 612-16. See also Cruse & Browne, supra note 76, at 130 (psychological theory
predicts that giving instructions before and again midway through the trial will
improve jurors' comprehension and produce better verdicts).
87. Kassin & Wrightsman, Coerced Confessos-, Judicial Instructions, and Mock Ju-
ror Verdicts, 11 J. APPED Soc. PsYCHOLOGY 489 (1981). See also Note, Helping
the Jury Evaluate Eyewitness Testimony: The Need for Additional Safeguards,
12 Am. CRIn. L. REV. 189, 216 (1984)(summarizes some of the psychology litera-
ture on problems and possible ineffectiveness of cautionary instructions).
88. Katzev & Wishart, The Impact of Judicial Commentary Concerning Eyewitness
Identifications on Jury Decision-Making, 76 J. CPim. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 733
(1985)(Chi-square = 4.04, p<.10). The study found that initial guilty decisions by
individuals dropped from 12/60 to 7/60 when the cautionary instruction was
given. In addition, cautionary instructions significantly reduced deliberation
time. Id.
89. Greene, Judges's Instruction on Eyewitness Testimony: Evaluation and Revi-
sion, 18 J. APPLED Soc. PsYcHoLoGY 252, 258, 266 (1988).
90. Oros& Elman, supra note 4, at 32.
91. See People v. Elliott, 158 Cal. App. 2d 623, 322 P.2d 1029 (1958).
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B. Empirical Research About Admonitions
Researchers with the University of Chicago Jury Project were the
first to conduct experiments on admonitions. They concluded that
neither instructions to disregard nor limiting instructions were
effective. Subjects appeared unable or unwilling to follow them.93
Admonitions, like charging instructions are difficult for jurors to un-
derstand,94 but the problem is more complicated. Admonishing jurors
often provokes the opposite of the intended effect. For example, in
one classic expiriment, when civil jurors found out that a defendant
was insured, mean verdicts increased from $33,000 to $37,000, but in-
creased to $46,000 when they were instructed to disregard it.95
Subsequent experiments on the effect of instructions to disregard a
variety of types of evidence all show similar results.96 Sue, Smith and
Caldwell tested the effect of instructions to disregard illegally ob-
tained incriminating evidence. They found that introducing the evi-
dence without comment increased the conviction rate by 26%, but that
instructing the jury to disregard it increased the conviction rate by
35%.97 Oros and Elman tested unfavorable character evidence, and
found that telling jurors to disregard it only made them judge the de-
fendant more harshly.98 Wolf and Montgomery tested both incrimi-
nating and exculpating evidence, and discovered that admonitions
tend to aggravate the effect of evidence in both directions. If jurors
are instructed to disregard incriminating evidence, they are more
likely to find the defendant guilty; if instructed to disregard exculpa-
tory evidence, they are more likely to acquit. 99
92. See, e.g., State v. Gong, 115 Idaho 86, 764 P.2d 453 (1988)(the improper cautionary
instruction stated no existing rule of law).
93. Note, Other Crimes Evidence at TriaL Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE
L.J. 763, 777 (1961). This is consistent with the "halo" effect. Psychological the-
ory predicts that jurors will infer other negative characteristics about a person
when some unfavorable information has been received. See Doob & Kir-
shenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of§ 12 of the Canada Evidence
Act Upon an Accused, 15 CRim. L.Q. 88, 89-90 (1972).
94. See Severance & Loftus, supra note 49 (jurors given limiting instruction concern-
ing use of a defendant's prior record showed no greater understanding of concept
than those given no instruction).
95. Broader, supra note 1, at 753-54; Kalven, supra note 3, at 377-78.
96. The phenomenon may be culturally relative. Cf. Cornish & Sealy, Juries and the
Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 208, 215 (British jurors did follow instruc-
tions to disregard evidence).
97. Sue, Smith & Caldwell, supra note 4, at 350-51.
98. Oros & Elman, supra note 4, at 32.
99. Wolf & Montgomery, supra note 4, at 213-16. Cf. Thompson, Fong & Rosenhan,
supra note 4, at 457-58 (although jurors ignored instructions to disregard exculpa-
tory evidence, they did have some ability to disregard incriminating evidence;
however, methodological problems, including the failure to measure whether the
particular "incriminating" evidence - a police officer's opinion - actually had
any impact on guilt in the first place, cast doubt on the efficacy of the finding).
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Empirical studies of limiting instructions show similar results:
they are likely either to be ineffective or to make matters worse.
Doob and Kirschenbaum's research showed that evidence of a defend-
ant's criminal record of similar offenses had a significant impact on
jurors' guilt decisions. Admonishing them to limit their use of that
evidence to the issue of the accused's credibility did not reduce its im-
pact, and had a marginal tendency to aggravate it.10o Hans and Doob
found similar effects using a single prior offense.'01 Wissler and Saks
varied both the seriousness of the crime charged and the similarity of
the prior convictions, and measured both guilt and credibility ratings.
They found that when jurors were instructed to limit their use of the
evidence to the credibility issue, they tended to do the opposite. Even
prior convictions for perjury had no effect on credibility, but any prior
similar conviction increased subjects' assessments of guilt.102 Tanford
and Cox replicated this result in the context of a civil case, finding
that instructing jurors to limit their use of criminal record evidence to
the defendant's credibility increased judgments of liability.os
Similar results have been obtained in experiments on the effect of
joinder. Limiting instructions appear to be ineffective in preventing a
spillover effect from one charge or defendant to another. Horowitz,
Bordens and Feldman demonstrated that if two cases are joined into a
single trial, and the jury is admonished to consider each charge inde-
pendently, the likelihood of conviction goes up anyway.104 Greene and
Loftus found that if trials are joined, there is a significantly greater
likelihood of conviction on each count than if they were tried sepa-
rately, whether or not a limiting instruction is given.1 05 Tanford and
Penrod also found that joinder increases the conviction rate when
charges are similar, and that an admonition has no effect. 06
100. Doob & Kirchenbaum, supra note 93 (in this experiment, the defendant did not
supply any important evidence of his own innocence so that his credibility should
not have played a significant role in the outcome of the case).
101. Hans & Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberation of
Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235, 242-49 (1975). Cf. Borgida & Park, supra
note 52, at 31 (instruction had no effect).
102. Wissler & Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions, 9 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 37, 41-44 (1985).
103. Tanford & Cox, The Effects of Impeachment Evidence and Limiting Instructions
On Individual and Group Decision Making, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 477, 484-87
(1988).
104. Horowitz, Bordens & Feldman, A Comparison of Verdicts Obtained in Severed
and Joined Criminal Trials, 10 J. AppLIED Soc. PsYcHoLOGY 444, 448-54
(1980)(compared to trying the cases separately).
105. Greene & Loftus, supra note 82, at 201-04.
106. Tanford & Penrod, Social Inference Processes in Juror Judgments of Multiple-
Offense Trials, 47 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 749 (1984). Cf. Tanford,
Penrod & Collins, Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials: The Influence of
Charge Similarity, Evidence Similarity, and Limiting Instructions, 9 LAW &
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IV. SENSE AND NONSENSE IN THE COURTROOM
The availability of this research provides an excellent opportunity
to critically examine current jury instruction procedures and deter-
mine if jurors are being instructed effectively. The question is vital
because of the central importance of the jury instruction to our trial
system.107 The answer, however, is not encouraging. Using the psy-
chology literature as a guide, an analysis of the law of jury instructions
reveals that courts predominantly rely on ineffective methods.
A. The Supreme Court
Since jury instruction practices tend to be matters of local proce-
dure, the Supreme Court rarely reviews them directly. However,
when the Court does have occasion to consider a trial judge's use of
jury instructions, it usually reviews them only for their legal correct-
ness without paying any attention to the problems of incomprehensi-
bility.10s When the Justices do explicitly express their views on how
they think jury instructions affect jury behavior, they display appal-
ling ignorance. Most commonly, the Justices reiterate their unques-
tioned belief in the "crucial assumption... that juries will follow the
instructions given by the trial judge. 109 By starting from this errone-
ous premise, the Court has reached some bizarre conclusions.
Two related cases are illustrative. In Lakeside v. Oregon,n1 0 the
defendant elected not to testify at trial. The defense attorney asked
the judge to forgo giving the jury an instruction to disregard the de-
Hum. BEHAv. 319 (1985)(limiting instruction had a marginal effect although au-
thors doubt the efficacy of the result).
107. See, e.g., Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62,73 (1979)(crucial assumption underlying
jury trial system).
108. See Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988)
(instructions in anti-trust case); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112
(1988)(instructions in § 1983 case); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231
(1988)(whether Allen charge is coercive); Monessen Sw. Ry. v. Morgan, 486 U.S.
330 (1988)(instructions on reducing future damages to present value); United
States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988)(instructions on involuntary servitude).
109. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979). See also Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798,
2810 (1988)(Blackmun, J., dissenting)("we must assume [jurors are] intelligent
and capable of following instructions"); Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8
(1987)("we . . . presume that a jury will follow instructions"); Richardson v.
Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987)("invariable assumption of the law that jurors fol-
low their instructions"); City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 798
(1986) ("juries act in accordance with the instructions given them"); United States
v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 450 n.13 (1986)(Court will not assume the jury misunder-
stood or disobeyed their instructions); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Ski-
ing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604 (1985)("we must assume that the jury followed the
court's instructions"); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983)(crucial
assumption is that juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial
judge).
110. 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
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fendant's failure to take the stand. The defendant argued that the in-
struction would only draw attention to the defendant's silence and
would be like "waving a red flag in front of the jury."'1 1 The judge
gave the instruction anyway and the defendant was convicted.
The psychology literature supports the defendant's objection. An
admonition will not reduce the likelihood that jurors will draw ad-
verse inferences from the defendant's silence, but will tend to aggra-
vate its prejudicial impact.=2 However, because the Justices
erroneously assume that jurors always follow their instructions, the
Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion. According to the
Court, the judge had a duty to make sure that the jury did not use the
defendant's silence against him and, therefore, correctly gave the in-
struction. The Court criticized the defense objection as based on "very
doubtful assumptions," scoffing at the notion that jurors would "to-
tally disregard the instruction, and affirmatively give weight to what
they have been told not to consider."n3 Of course, the Court is wrong;,
that is exactly what jurors do.
Carter v. Kentucky,f14 presented the opposite situation. Again, the
defendant elected not to testify at trial. This time, however, the de-
fense attorney wanted the jury to be instructed to disregard the de-
fendant's silence." 5 The trial judge did exactly what the empirical
research suggests is the solution most favorable to the defendant and
refused to give the instruction. 1" 6 Nevertheless, the defendant com-
plained to the Supreme Court that the trial judge's action harmed
him.
This time, the psychology literature does not support the defend-
ant. If the trial judge had given the requested admonition, it would
either have had no effect or would only have made matters worse.
However, because the Court erroneously assumes that instructions al-
ways work, it again reached the opposite conclusion. The Justices
stated their belief that the instruction should be given because an ad-
monition was a "powerful tool" that would "reduce... speculation to a
minimum" 1 7 and effectively remove from deliberations any adverse
inferences the jurors might draw." 8
111. Id. at 339-40.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
113. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333,340 (1978). See also Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756,
766 n.8 (1987)(presumes jury followed instruction to disregard prosecutor's com-
ment on defendant's silence); Commonwealth v. Rolan, 520 Pa. 1, 549 A.2d 553
(1988)(cautionary instruction to disregard prosecutor's comment on defendant's
silence cured prejudice).
114. 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
115. Id. at 294.
116. See supr text accompanying notes 97-99.
117. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 303 (1981).
118. Id. at 301.
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In a variety of other situations, the Court has reached decisions
inconsistent with the empirical research on jury instructions. When
reviewing charging instructions, the Justices assume that jurors act in
accordance with their instructions1 9 after correctly deciphering even
confusing ones. 120 When reviewing admonitions, they usually assume
that instructions to disregard prejudicial information will be effec-
tive.12 ' Similarly, the Court asserts that while it may not always be
easy for the jurors to perform the mental gymnastics necessary to fol-
low a limiting instruction, "carefully crafted limiting instructions" re-
duce to a minimum the risk of prejudice in cases involving
misjoinder,12 2 evidence of other crimes12 3 and codefendant confes-
sions.12 4 The Court has steadfastly adhered to this belief:
The rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions is a pragmatic
one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in
the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the inter-
ests of the state and the defendant.1 2 5
B. Jury Instruction Practices Generally
The Supreme Court's erroneous beliefs about juror behavior are
unfortunate but have little impact on the way in which actual juries
are instructed because decisions on proper instruction procedures are
made by lower, primarily state, courts. Therefore, it would be prema-
ture to conclude that all current jury instruction practices are ques-
tionable based on the Court's sparse decisions and dicta.
Nor is there any other single source that will adequately provide
information about procedures for all the different types of instruc-
tions. Charging instructions tend to be written by advisory commit-
tees that are set up by courts or bar associations and given the task of
drafting and modernizing pattern instruction books. Admonitions
tend to be part of the case law decided by appellate judges. Therefore,
119. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 798 (1986).
120. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 234 (1987)(instructions on burden of proof in
self-defense case were adequate even though confusing).
121. E.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39,47 n.6 (1984)(taint from prejudicial publicity is
"attenuated where... the jurors have been... instructed not to ... read or view
press accounts of the matter"). Cf. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988)(screen
placed between child witness and defendant probably affected jurors' perception
of accused despite instruction to disregard it).
122. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449-50, 450 n.13 (1986).
123. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983)(proof of prior crimes is
acceptable despite prejudice to defendant if "accompanied by instructions limit-
ing the jury's use of the conviction").
124. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987). See also Tennessee v. Street, 471
U.S. 409, 417 (1985)(limiting instruction was an appropriate way to limit use of
hearsay consistent with confrontation clause).
125. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987).
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to explore the issue of whether jurors are being instructed effectively,
both sources must be considered.
1. Charging Instructions
Pattern instructions generally are drafted by advisory committees
consisting of judges and lawyers, and more rarely, law professors.126
These committees frequently update the instructions to reflect
changes in the law. Most states have revised their pattern instructions
since the publication of the literature on improving comprehensibility.
Have they tried to incorporate psycholinguistic principles in the latest
versions of their charging instructions, or do they continue to use their
old, legalistic style of incoherent instruction?
There have been some notable efforts to draft comprehensible in-
structions. Dean Perlman and Professor Saltzburg, in preparing civil
instructions for Alaska127 and federal criminal jury instructions,128
have tried to incorporate psycholinguistic principles. They specifically
set out to write a modern set of understandable pattern instructions
by following the suggestions made by Charrow and Charrow,129 and
Elwork, Sales and Alfini.130 Other attempts to write comprehensible
instructions according to these principles have been undertaken in
Pennsylvania, Florida, Arizona,13 and Michigan.132
However, most states have made no effort to simplify and improve
their pattern jury instructions. 3 3 Indeed, they often continue to use
the very instructions proven to be difficult for jurors to comprehend.
In civil cases, for example, the traditional causation instruction de-
fines proximate cause as "a cause which, in a natural and continuous
sequence, produces damage, and without which the damage would not
have occurred." 3 4 In two studies, this instruction was found to be in-
126. P. NmLAND, supra note 15, at 11, 71-105.
127. H. PERLMAN & S. SALTzBURG, ALAsiA PATTERN CIvIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
(1981).
128. S. SALTZBURG & H. PERLMAN, FEDERAL CRnmNAL JURY INSTRUCTIONs (1985).
129. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 55.
130. Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 48. See Perlman, supra note 15, at 523-24.
Interestingly, Perlman and Saltzburg, both lawyers, did not use the assistance of
a psycholinguist, but decided to prepare the instructions themselves.
131. R. NIELAND, supra note 15, at 24-27. See, e.g., FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS xviii-xix (2d ed. 1981)(committee stated its intent to draft simpler, more
comprehensible instructions).
132. Compare MICHIGAN STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL § 15.01, § 21.01
(1970)(proximate cause, burden of proof respectively) with MICHIGAN STANDARD
JURY INSTRUCTIONs § 15.01, § 16.01 (2d ed. 1981)(both instructions rewritten and
improved).
133. By comparison, 27 states require that insurance contracts be written in plain Eng-
lish. See Andrews, Trial By Language, STUDENT LAW., Oct. 1983, at 11.
134. ARKANsAs MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 501 (2d ed. 1974). See also CALI-
FORNIA JURY INsTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 3.75 (5th ed. 1969).
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comprehensible.13 5 Nevertheless, most states continue to use it.136
One of the studies which specifically tested California's version of this
instruction, found that jurors could not understand it and published
the results in a prominent law review.137 However, when California
revised its instructions in 1988, it kept the old incomprehensible ver-
sion intact.13 8 Other kinds of common civil instructions that are diffi-
cult for jurors to understand, such as burden of proof and contributory
negligence,139 also remain unchanged in many states.140
The same situation appears in criminal cases. For example, several
investigators have found that the traditional instructions on the pre-
sumption of innocence and burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
are not understood by jurors.141 Nevertheless, most states continue to
use them.142 Researchers also found that jurors have difficulty under-
standing the customary circumstantial evidence charge43 and instruc-
tions on the state of mind necessary for the crime of attempted
135. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 55, at 1323.
136. Compare ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 501 (2d ed. 1974) with
ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 501 (3d ed. 1989)(no change).
Compare TEXAs PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 2.02 (1969) with TEXAS PATTERN
JURY CHARGES § 2.04 (2d ed. 1987)(no change). Cf. compare COLORADO JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 9:24 (1969) with COLORADO JURY INsTRUCTIONS-CVIL
§ 9:26 (3d ed. 1989)(minor changes unlikely to affect comprehension, e.g., chang-
ing "without which the claimed injury would not have been sustained" to "not
have been incurred").
137. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 55, at 1323.
138. Compare CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 3.75 (5th ed. 1969) with CALI-
FORNIA JURY INSTRUCIONS-CIVIL § 3.75 (7th ed. 1988)(identical).
139. See Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 48, at 176; Charrow & Charrow, supra
note 55, at 1350-51.
140. Compare ARKANSAS MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 202, § 302 (2d ed.
1974)(burden of proof and contributory negligence, respectively) with ARKANSAS
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 202, § 2102 (3d ed. 1989)(no changes). Com-
Pare CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 3.50 (5th ed. 1969)(contributory
negligence) with CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 3.50 (7th ed. 1986)(ba-
sic definition unchanged). Compare OREGON JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL
CASES § 21.02 (1964)(burden of proof) with OREGON JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR
CrvL CASES § 21.02 (2d ed. 1984)(no change). Cf. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS-CVIL § 2.60 (7th ed. 1986); COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 3.1
(3d ed. 1989)(minor changes in burden of proof instructions compared to earlier
versions).
141. A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALFINI, supra note 58, at 321; Severance, Greene &
Loftus, supra note 54, at 203-04; Strawn & Buchanan, supra note 47, at 481.
142. Compare CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 2.90 (3d ed. 1970) with
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 2.90 (5th ed. 1988)(no significant
change in wording). Compare ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CRIMINAL
§ 2.03 (1968) with ILLIOIS PATrERN JURY INSTRUCnONs--CRnMNAL § 2.03 (2d ed.
1981) (no change). Compare D. AARONSON, MARYLAND CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS AND COMMENTARY §§ 1.02-1.04 (1975) with D. AARONSON, MARYLAND CRIM-
INAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND COMMENTARY §§ 1.02-1.04 (2d ed. 1988)(no major
changes).
143. E.g., Strawn & Buchanan, supra note 47, at 480-81.
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murder.1 44 Yet these instructions also remain unchanged in most
states.14 5
Apart from changes in the wording of pattern instructions, psy-
chologists have suggested that comprehension is maximized if the jury
charge is given in writing or repeated several times. In addition, in-
structions which are related contextually to the facts of the case are
more comprehensible.146 The practice in most states, however, re-
mains inconsistent with these suggestions. Courts seem to go out of
their way to make it impossible for jurors to understand their
instructions.
Few states require that a written copy of the charge be given to the
jury.147 Indeed, the common law, for some bizarre reason, prohibits
the judge from giving the jury written instructions.148 Although some
jurisdictions have modified the rule to permit the judge to give the
jury a written copy of the instructions, most do not require it.'49 Even
among the few judges who use their discretion to allow the jury to see
written instructions, some do not allow them to be taken to the jury
room.
5 0
Most states do not require, or even suggest, that instructions be
repeated.' 5 ' The accepted procedure is that a full set of instructions is
144. E.g., Severance, Greene & Loftus, supra note 54, at 204, 207.
145. E.g., compare ILLINoIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRniNAL § 3.02
(1988)("Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts or circumstances which give
rise to a reasonable inference of other facts which tend to show the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant Circumstantial evidence should be considered by you to-
gether with all the other evidence in the case in arriving at your verdict. You
should not find the defendant guilty unless the facts and circumstances proved
exclude every reasonable theory of innocence") with ILLINOIs PATTERN JuRY IN-
STRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 3.02 (2d ed. 1981)(identical). Compare CALIFORNIA
JURY INsTRuaToINs-CRn=AL § 1.22 (3d ed. 1970)(definition of malice similar to
that used in study by Elwork, Sales & Alfini) with CALaFoRNiA JURy INSTRUC-
TIONS-CRnNAL § 1.22 (5th ed. 1988)(no change).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 70-74 and 84-85.
147. For some that do require written instructions for jurors, see Id. R. Civ. P. 51; Nev.
I. Civ. P.; N.D. IL Crim. P. 30; Tex. Code Crim. P. 36.18.
148. See United States v. Hooper, 575 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1978); Wofford v. State, 271
Ind. 518, 394 N.E.2d 100 (1979). See also R. NuELD, supra note 15, at 28 (written
instructions flatly prohibited in seven states). Cf. MD. CRmi. C. 4-325(c)(written
instructions require consent of parties).
149. Compare United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d 1101 (7th
Cir. 1979)(no error for trial judge to send written copy of instructions to jury
room) with United States v. Quilty, 541 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1976)(no error for trial
judge to refuse to send instructions to jury room). See MIcH. Or. .
2.516(B)(5)(judge "may" provide written instructions to jury). But cf. Parker v.
State, 270 Ark. 897,606 S.W.2d 74 (1980)(instructions must be sent to jury room).
150. E.g., MD. CRi. C. 4-326(a)(instructions may be taken to jury room only with per-
mission of court). See Schwarzer, supra note 16, at 756-57 (matter for judicial
discretion). Cf. Severance, Greene & Loftus, supra note 54, at 215 n.59 (custom-
ary practice in Seattle is to send copy to jury room).
151. Michigan is one of the few states which requires that instructions be repeated.
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given only once at the conclusion of the trial.152 Even some states
which have used psychological principles to rewrite simplified instruc-
tions have not followed the psychologists' advice that judges should be
required to read instructions more than once so jurors will remember
them. For example, Florida's revised instructions encourage giving in-
structions more than once, but leave it to the individual judge's
discretion.s5 3
Few states permit the judge to place abstract instructions into the
concrete context of the facts of the case1 54 because of the prohibition
against commenting on the evidence. This prohibition, prompted by a
fear that judges will display favoritism, prevents judges from expres-
sing their views on how the facts could be applied to the law.' 55
States using special verdicts, or verdicts with interrogatories, gen-
erally prohibit judges from telling jurors the legal effect of their an-
swers to the questions.156 Courts fear that if the jury clearly
understands the law, it might try to manipulate its answers to achieve
a certain result in derogation of the law.157 In other words, in this
instance courts are deliberately trying to make the law incomprehen-
sible so the jury cannot evade it! If this is the mentality of our policy-
making appellate judges, it is little wonder that there has been no rush
to adopt psycholinguistically rewritten instructions that would im-
prove comprehension.
See MICH. CT. R. 2.516(b)(preliminary instruction on the applicable law must be
given).
152. E.g., MIssouRI APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS xxxviii (3d ed. 1981)(although giv-
ing instructions more than once is discretionary, the elements of law should not
be repeated). See also VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS--CRIMINAL § 2.050
(Repl. ed. 1989)(preliminary instruction does not include elements of law); WIS-
CONSIN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 50 (1981 & Supp. 1989)(preliminary instruc-
tion does not include an explanation of the controlling law). Cf. Elchin v. State,
47 Md. App. 358, 365, 424 A.2d 155, 159 (1980)(instructions may be given more
than once).
153. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES vii (1981).
154. E.g., MIsSOURI APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS xcvi (3d ed. 1981)(unless there are
multiple plaintiffs or defendants, parties should not be referred to by name but as
plaintiff and defendant).
155. See R. NIELAND, supra note 15, at 33 (states are split); Steele & Thornburg, supra
note 17, at 101-03. Cf. MICH. CT. R. 2.516(B)(3)(comment on evidence permitted
at judge's discretion). Contra State v. Hardwick, 1 Conn. App. 609, 610-11, 475
A.2d 315,318 (1984)(judges may comment on evidence as long as they do not show
favoritism).
156. Steele & Thornburg, supra note 17, at 103-04.
157. See McGowan v. Story, 70 Wis. 2d 189, 198, 234 N.W.2d 325, 329 (1975); Holland v.
Peterson, 95 Idaho 728, 732, 518 P.2d 1190, 1194 (1974). In the federal courts, the
judge has discretion to tell the jury about the effect of its answers. See Steele &
Thornburg, supra note 17, at 104. Some states also allow such an explanation.
E.g., Roman v. Mitchell, 82 N.J. 336, 345-47, 413 A.2d 322, 327 (1980).
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2. Admonitions
Admonitions, largely the product of case law,s5 8 have been shown
to be ineffective. However, since the first studies demonstrating their
ineffectiveness were published in 1958,159 appellate courts have ap-
proved their use in approximately 21,000 cases - a ninety-five percent
approval rate.1 6 0 The very fact that they are still used with such regu-
larity, despite the empirical evidence that they do not work, suggests
that a problem exists.
a. Instructions to Disregard
The empirical research clearly demonstrates that instructions to
disregard are ineffective in reducing the harm caused by inadmissible
evidence and improper arguments.16 ' Yet when appellate courts re-
view the use or nonuse of these instructions, many start from the erro-
neous presumption that they are completely effective. These courts
state that the law "directs (and properly so) that a jury is presumed to
have followed the instructions of the court" to disregard improper in-
formation. 6 2 They "presume not only that the jurors followed the
court's instructions, but that they followed them to the letter."63
Therefore, the courts conclude, if the trial judge instructs the jury to
disregard incriminating evidence, the instruction "fully protect[s] the
defendant's rights" 64 and is just as effective as retrying the case with-
out any mention of the evidence. 6 5
Other courts incorrectly assume that an instruction to disregard
improper evidence must be at least partly effective. Therefore, the
giving of the instruction ordinarily reduces the amount of harm
caused by the evidence and converts reversible to non-reversible er-
158. Cf. FED. R. EvIn. 105 ('When evidence.., is admissible ... for one purpose but
not... another .... the court ... shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and
instruct the jury accordingly").
159. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
160. A LEXIS search for all state and federal cases since 1958 referring to admonitions
by their various alternative names yielded 41,158 citations. Close examination of
several samples indicated that about 55%, or 23,000, actually involved an issue
concerning the propriety of admonitions. Of that 23,000, only about 5% (1,650)
disapproved of their use.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 95-99.
162. State v. Foster, 755 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988)(instruction to disre-
gard evidence of a defendant's uncharged criminal activity). See also State v.
Johnson, 762 S.W.2d 110, 116 (Tenn. 1988)(jury presumed to follow their
instructions).
163. Montgomery v. State, 760 S.W.2d 323, 327 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)(emphasis in origi-
nal)(instruction to disregard information about parole laws). See also Dewitt v.
State, 763 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)(prompt instruction to disregard
inflammatory remark sufficient to cure error).
164. People v. Brock, 143 A.D.2d 678, 679, 532 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904 (1988).
165. State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, -, 546 A.2d 292, 301-03 (1988).
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ror.1 66 This is called the "cured-error" doctrine.167 Courts state in
their opinions that instructing a jury to disregard otherwise prejudi-
cial evidence is "adequate,"168 "sufficient,"169 or will be deemed70 to
remove the damaging effect of prejudicial evidence,171 thereby reduc-
ing the level of prejudice. Even if it does not completely eliminate all
harm, this "cures" the error,172 and, at worst, only harmless error
remains.173
The end result is that if jurors are exposed to prejudicial informa-
tion during a trial and the judge emphasizes it by instructing them to
disregard it the appellate courts will not consider ordering a new trial
because of these mistaken assumptions. For example, in criminal
cases, exposure to adverse media coverage has been shown to signifi-
cantly increase jurors' tendencies to vote guilty.174 Instructing the
jury to disregard the publicity is likely only to make things worse.
However, courts insist that such instructions provide adequate protec-
tion to the defendant and, therefore, take care of the problem.175
There are other examples. If jurors find out that a criminal de-
fendant has a record of committing similar crimes, the likelihood of
conviction increases significantly.176 Although admonitions will only
166. Cuesta v. State, 763 S.W.2d 547, 555-56 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
167. See Tanford, An Introduction to Trial Law, 51 Mo. L. REv. 623, 706-09 (1986)(gen-
eral discussion of cured error doctrine).
168. Commonwealth v. Rolan, 520 Pa. 1, 9, 549 A.2d 553, 556 (1988); Tomaszewski v.
Godbole, 174 IMl. App. 3d 629, 634, 529 N.E.2d 260, 264 (1988).
169. Tzystuck v. Chicago Trans. Auth., 124 Ill. 2d 226, 245, 529 N.E.2d 525, 533
(1988)(insinuating that attorneys suborned perjury); Streeter v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 533 So. 2d 54, 62 (La. Ct. App. 1988)(offer to pay damages); Woodward v.
State, 533 So. 2d 418, 432-33 (Miss. 1988)(criticizing other attorney).
170. State v. Sims, 764 S.W.2d 692, 695-96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
171. State v. DeGroot, 230 Neb. 101, 105-06, 430 N.W.2d 290, 292-93 (1988).
172. In re Times-World Corp., 7 Va. App. 317, -, 373 S.E.2d 474, 480 (1988); People v.
Olivencia, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1391, 1403, 251 Cal. Rptr. 880, 888 (1988); Crawford v.
State, 188 Ga. App. 841, 842, 374 S.E.2d 781, 781-82 (1988); Burnett v. Martin, 405
So. 2d 23, 25 (Ala. 1981).
173. Rodriguez v. State, 757 S.W.2d 420, 421 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Odom, 529
So. 2d 154, 155 (La. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Weaver, 158 Ariz. 407, 407-10, 762 P.2d
1361, 1363 (Ct. App. 1988).
174. See Padawer-Singer & Barton, The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors' Ver-
dicts, in THE JURY SYsTEM IN AMERICA 134 (R. Simon ed. 1975)(59% of subjects
exposed to pretrial publicity voted guilty while only 35% of unexposed subjects
voted guilty). Cf. Hoiberg & Stires, The Effect of Several Types of Pretrial Public-
ity on the Guilt Attributions of Simulated Jurors, 3 J. APPLIE Soc. PsYCHoLOGY
267 (1973)(pretrial publicity affected female subjects' tendency to conclude de-
fendant was guilty).
175. E.g., In re Times-World Corp., 7 Va. App. 317, -, 373 S.E.2d 474, 480 (1988); Peo-
ple v. Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d 1189, 1219-20, 756 P.2d 795, 815 (1988). Cf. State v.
Biegenwald, 524 A.2d 130, 172 n.12 (N.J. 1987)(Handler, J., dissenting)(empirical
evidence suggests that "jurors are influenced by prejudicial publicity and carry
that bias into jury deliberations, regardless of the court's instructions").
176. Cornish & Sealy, supra note 96, at 217; Doob & Kirschenbaum, supra note 93, at
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exacerbate the problem, courts stubbornly insist they eliminate preju-
dice.177 If jurors find out that a civil defendant is insured, the amount
of damages awarded increases significantly.'7 8 Even though in-
structing the jury to disregard insurance will only make things worse,
courts consistently hold to the contrary, i.e., that admonitions elimi-
nate prejudice.i79 If jurors discover the judge's views on the merits of
the case, it can affect their verdicts.80 Again, courts continue to assert
that the instructions dispel prejudice even though admonitions to dis-
regard are only likely to make matters worse.18 1
b. Limiting Instructions
A similar systematic counterproductiveness is found in courts' use
of limiting instructions. Empirical research clearly demonstrates that
they are not effective in preventing the jury from improperly using
information.18 2 Yet many appellate courts continue to assume that ju-
rors can and will obey limiting instructions. The courts state that ad-
monitions "ensure that there is no... abuse" 8 3 and guarantee that
the jury has a "proper understanding of the evidence," 8 4 thereby
preventing any improper use of it.185 Other courts assume that limit-
ing instructions will work, 8 6 or at least that they are adequate to re-
92-95; Hans & Doob, supra note 101, at 242-43; Wissler & Saks, supra note 102, at
41-42.
177. E.g., Martin v. State, 528 NX.E2d 461,464 (Ind. 1988)(instruction cured error when
evidence of involvement in other robberies was admitted against defendant
charged with robbery); Gowin v. State, 760 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988)(instruction cured error when evidence of other drunk driving charges was
admitted against defendant charged with driving while intoxicated).
178. See Broeder, supra note 1, at 753-74; Kalven, supra note 3, at 377-78 (experiment
in which simulated juries' verdicts increased when they were told the defendant
was insured).
179. Clark v. Vandermeer, 740 P.2d 921, 925 (Wyo. 1987). Cf. Barsema v. Susong, 156
Ariz. 309, 314, 751 P.2d 969, 974 (1988)(insurance should be admissible for limited
purpose if judge carefully instructs the jury about it).
180. See Katzev & Wishart, supra note 88, at 738-41 (effect of judicial comment on
merits of case affected some individual and group guilty verdicts).
181. E.g., Maulding v. State, 296 Ark. 328, 333-35, 757 S.W.2d 916, 919 (1988)(no error
when judge instructed jury to disregard his comments critical of defense); Mont-
gomery v. State, 760 S.W.2d 323, 328 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)(jury was presumed to
have followed instructions to disregard an unconstitutional instruction about pa-
role laws given earlier by the same judge).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 100-06.
183. United States v. Alvarez, 860 F.2d 801, 827 n.27 (7th Cir. 1988).
184. Howard v. State, 549 A.2d 692, 695 (Del. 1988).
185. Mullen v. Princess Anne Vol. Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130, 1134-35 (4th Cir. 1988)(in-
stead of excluding evidence, trial court could issue a cautionary instruction that
racial epithets could only be considered on the question of discriminatory intent).
186. United States v. Alvarez, 860 F.2d 801, 827 n.27 (7th Cir. 1988)(very explicit in-
struction prevented prejudice); State v. Banta, 15 Conn. App. 161, 171, 544 A.2d
1226, 1232 (1988)(emphatic instruction).
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duce the level of prejudice below the reversible-error point.18 7
Therefore,-most courts hold "unquestionably" that limiting instruc-
tions should be given,1 88 and once given, "cure" any error.18 9
The result is similar to what occurs when courts rely on instruc-
tions to disregard. Evidence that could have a profound, improper ef-
fect on the verdict is routinely admitted, and objections to it are not
given serious consideration by the appellate courts because of the mis-
taken notion that the admonition will prevent any prejudice. The
prime example is evidence of uncharged criminal acts, admitted under
rule 404(b)190 when the purpose is to show motive, intent, identity,
common scheme, and so forth. Numerous studies with simulated ju-
ries show that proof of a defendant's involvement in similar crimes
significantly increases guilty verdicts,191 and that jurors cannot or will
not limit their use of that information. However, courts insist that
evidence of similar crimes should be routinely admitted, even when
offered only to prove minor issues, because jurors will obey the admo-
nition not to consider it on the issue of culpability.192 Similarly, ex-
periments suggest that joining multiple offenses or defendants into a
single trial significantly increases conviction rates193 and that limiting
187. See United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335,
1370-71 (2d Cir. 1988) (instructions sufficient for their purpose); State v. Woodson,
551 A.2d 1187, 1193-94 (R.I. 1988)(limiting instruction constituted "adequate
safety measure").
188. State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 503-08, 548 A.2d 1058, 1083-85 (1988)(in view of the
repetitive and highly inflammatory nature of the evidence, failure to instruct jury
was clearly prejudicial).
189. State v. Porambo, 226 N.J. Super. 416, 425-26, 544 A.2d 870, 874-75 (1988). See also
People v. Tinning, 142 A.D.2d 402, 408, 536 N.Y.S.2d 193, 197 (1988)(made error
harmless). Cf. Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 424-26 (D.C. 1988)(court
stated that limiting instructions generally work even though they probably did
not in this case).
190. FED. R. EVIn. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity there-
with. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or ab-
sence of mistake or accident.
191. See supra note 176.
192. See United States v. Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 1176-77 (10th Cir. 1988)(in prosecution
for sexual assault, evidence of a similar assault was admitted to show intent);
Young v. State, 296 Ark. 394, 396-97, 757 S.W.2d 544, 546 (1988)(in sexual assault
case, evidence of a prior homosexual act was used to show depraved sexual in-
stinct); People v. Tinning, 142 A.D.2d 402, 536 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1988)(evidence that
defendant had killed other children was admitted in murder case to show intent
and absence of mistake); State v. Ramos, 553 A.2d 275, 280-81 (N.H. 1988)(prior
drug conviction used to impeach defendant in prosecution for sale of narcotics).
193. See Greene & Loftus, supra note 82, at 201 (murder case tried by itself produced
19% guilty verdicts; rape case tried by itself produced 29% guilty verdicts; joint
trial produced 44% guilty verdicts in murder case, 46% in rape case). Cf.
Horowitz, Bordens & Feldman, supra note 104, at 453 (mixed results); Tanford,
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instructions do not reduce this spillover effect. Nevertheless, most
courts, including the Supreme Court, approve of joined trials because
they are more efficient, insisting that limiting instructions prevent
prejudice to defendants. 94
c. Procedural Default Doctrine
In the interests of an orderly and efficient judicial system, the ap-
pellate courts generally will not consider an issue unless it was first
presented to the trial court. A party must have objected during trial
and requested the remedy that is now asked for on appeal; otherwise,
the appellant is said to have implicitly waived the right to appeal on
that issue. This is known as the procedural default doctrine.195 Be-
cause judges erroneously believe that admonitions effectively reduce
the harm associated with prejudicial evidence, the procedural default
doctrine requires that parties request counter-productive admonitions.
The cases hold that a party cannot appeal based on the erroneous ad-
mission of prejudicial evidence if it failed to request an instruction to
disregard that evidence.9 6 Similarly, a party cannot get the courts to
hear an appeal based on the prejudicial spillover effect of evidence
admissible for a limited purpose unless it requested a limiting
instruction. 9 7
The consequence is that the party who is harmed by prejudicial
evidence is caught like Odysseus between Scylla and Charybdis. For
example, suppose that a defendant is on trial for smuggling cocaine.
After the defendant testifies, the trial judge allows the prosecutor to
impeach the defendant by proving a prior misdemeanor conviction for
possession of drugs.19s This is an erroneous decision since the rules of
Penrod & Collins, supra note 106, at 328-29, 332-33 (increased conviction rate
when similar or identical charges joined).
194. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209-11 (1987); United States v. McCoy, 848
F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Pierce, 733 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1983); State v. Barnes, 94 N.C. App.
484, 372 S.E.2d 352 (1988).
195. See Tanford, supra note 167, at 702-06 (describing doctrine and its consequences).
196. See Dominguez v. State, 759 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); Reed v. Spencer, 758
S.W.2d 736 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). See also Dugan v. Weber, 175 IlM. App. 3d 1088,
530 N.E.2d 1007 (1988)(underlying issue was waived when judge offered instruc-
tion and party refused); State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, -, 546 A.2d 292,
301-03 (1988)(similar).
197. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 851 F.2d 742, 745 n.4 (5th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Manteos-Sanchez, 864 F.2d 232, 237-38 (1st Cir. 1988); Mares v.
State, 758 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). See also United States v. Perry,
857 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1988)(evidence admissible for unimportant purpose, no
objection or request for instruction); Commonwealth v. Mandile, 403 Mass. 93,525
N.E.2d 1322 (1988)(issue waived when defendant neither objected to joinder nor
requested limiting instruction).
198. See United States v. Manteos-Sanchez, 864 F.2d 232, 237-38 (1st Cir. 1988). See
also United States v. Perry, 857 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1988)(defendant charged with
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evidence permit only felonies and crimes involving false statements to
be used to impeach credibility.199 The judge's error is prejudicial be-
cause it significantly increases the likelihood that the jury will find
the defendant guilty20o and, thus, may be considered reversible error
if the defendant appeals.
Now what does the defendant do? If he requests an admonition in
order to preserve the issue for appeal, his tactical position at trial is
worsened because the admonition will probably backfire and increase
the defendant's chances of conviction. The request also will worsen
the defendant's position for appeal. If the judge gives the admonition,
the appellate courts will consider the error cured even though the ac-
tual level of prejudice increased. If the defendant does not request an
admonition, however, he will still worsen his position for appeal. Fail-
ure to request an admonition will bar an appeal from the trial judge's
original prejudicial decision because of procedural default. Although a
rule of evidence has been violated, and the defendant has been
prejudiced, the error is not reversible no matter what the attorney
does. It is a Catch-22 worthy of Joseph Heller.
d. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Rule
The dilemma in which lawyers find themselves provides fertile
ground on which defendants may collaterally attack their convictions
for ineffective assistance of counsel. Under the standards set by the
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington,o1 the benchmark for
judging a claim of ineffectiveness is whether counsel's conduct under-
mined the proper functioning of the adversary system so that the trial
cannot be relied on as producing a just result202 This is determined by
a two part "error and prejudice" test: Did the lawyer's conduct fall
below an objective standard of reasonableness? 2 03 And, is there a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would
have been different?204
The interaction of the Strickland doctrine with the courts' errone-
ous assumptions about admonitions can produce surreal results. For
example, consider the problem stated above in which a defendant is on
trial for one crime and prejudicial evidence of other crimes is errone-
tax evasion and mail fraud, judge admits evidence of prior bankruptcy fraud);
People v. Fana, 142 A.D.2d 684, 531 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1988)(defendant charged with
robbery could be impeached by prior burglary convictions).
199. E.g., FED. R. EvID. 609(a).
200. See supra text accompanying note 176.
201. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164-66 (1986)(Strickland
followed). See also Amadeo v. Zant, 108 S. Ct. 1771, 1776-80 (1988)(standards for
excusing defendant from procedural default).
202. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-86 (1984).
203. Id. at 687-91.
204. Id. at 691-96.
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ously admitted by the trial judge. If the attorney requests an admoni-
tion, she would seem to have acted unreasonably. She has increased
the chances that her own client will be convicted and triggered the
cured error doctrine that prevents the underlying evidentiary error
from being reviewed. The defendant is now in a considerably worse
position. Even though both parts of the Strickland test would appear
to be met, most courts approve the attorney's conduct and affirm con-
victions under these circumstances. 205
On the other hand, if the attorney has read the psychology litera-
ture, and therefore does not request an instruction that the jury disre-
gard or limit their use of the evidence, then her conduct has been
reasonable. It improves the client's trial position compared to request-
ing an admonition, and has no effect on the client's appeal position
because the error cannot be reversed either way. The defendant
would seem to have no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Yet,
despite the general reluctance of federal courts to grant any habeas
petitions,2 06 some of these nonsensical claims have been granted.07
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR LAW REFORM
Using psychology to critique current jury instruction procedures
reveals significant problems: courts give incomprehensible instruc-
tions that jurors do not understand or follow, and that in many cases
may cause jurors to do the opposite of what the judge wants them to
do. Can (or should) anything be done about it?
A. Rewritten Pattern Instructions
The consequences of jurors not understanding the law can be
profound. In Sellars v. United States,20 8 the jury found the defendant
guilty of homicide when it meant to free him. Jurors later told the
court that they had misunderstood the self defense instruction. They
believed that if the defendant acted in self defense he still had to be
convicted of manslaughter. Nevertheless, neither the trial judge nor
205. See Cape v. Francis, 741 F.2d 1287, 1301 (11th Cir. 1984)(attorney who failed to
object to prejudicial evidence, but later asked for and received an instruction to
disregard, provided effective representation).
206. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-29 (1982). See Hoffmann, The Supreme
Court's New Vision of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Pisoners, 1989 Sup. CT.
REV. 165.
207. See Julius v. Johnson, 840 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1988)(failure to request limiting
instruction rendered representation ineffective); Lyons v. McCotter, 770 F.2d 529,
534-35 (5th Cir. 1985)(conviction reversed when failure to request limiting in-
struction rendered representation ineffective); Vela v. Estelle, 708 F.2d 954, 963-
64 (5th Cir. 1983) (failure to request instruction to disregard resulted in ineffective
representation); Camillo v. State, 757 S.W.2d 234, 239-41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)(in-
struction to disregard).
208. 401 A.2d 974, 980-82 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979).
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the court of appeals would allow the verdict to be changed. Steele and
Thornburg document eighteen additional cases in which erroneous
verdicts based on jurors' misunderstandings of the law were af-
firmed.209 The courts hold that misinterpretation of the charge is to
be expected,210 does not constitute jury misconduct,2 1 1 and, therefore,
is not grounds for a new trial.212 Rules of procedure protecting the
secrecy of jury deliberations make erroneous verdicts based on a mis-
understanding of law almost impossible to detect.213 Therefore, a cho-
rus of law reformers advocate the use of psycholinguistics to write
better pattern instructions to try to prevent misunderstanding at the
start.214 Everyone seems to agree that this would be an important step
toward better trials.
Despite this consensus, it is not at all clear that rewriting instruc-
tions will result in anything more than trivial improvement in jury
performance. Certainly, the psycholinguists have made good sugges-
tions, and it is always worthwhile to try to improve the clarity and
simplicity of pattern instructions. But several factors suggest that this
may not result in much of a net improvement of the jury trial system.
Rewriting some instructions may be a pointless task because it is
the law itself that is incomprehensible. Law professors have tried for
years to find clear, simple, and understandable ways to explain com-
plicated legal doctrine to their students, but there is little evidence we
have succeeded. If we cannot explain in several weeks to our students
what proximate cause means,21 5 even the most clearly written para-
graph defining this concept is unlikely to be satisfactorily understood
by jurors. If the law itself is incoherent,2 16 no amount of redrafting of
pattern instructions is going to result in jurors understanding it.
209. Steele & Thornburg, supra note 17, at 80-83.
210. E.g., Whited v. Powell, 155 Tex. 210, 216, 285 S.W.2d 364, 368 (1956).
211. E.g., Compton v. Henrie, 364 S.W.2d 179, 184 (Tex. 1963).
212. E.g., Davis v. Pacific Diesel Power Co., 41 Or. App. 597,600-01,598 P.2d 1228,1230-
31 (1979); Hoffman v. Deck Masters, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 438,443 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
213. See FED. R. EviD. 606(b)(former jurors incompetent to testify to anything that
occurred during deliberations, their mental processes, or the reasons they voted a
particular way); Pope, The Mental Operations of Jurors, 40 TEX. L. REV. 849, 851-
52 (1962); Tanford, supra note 167, at 698-99.
214. See Imwinkelreid & Schwed, Guidelines for Drafting Understandable Jury In-
structions: An Introduction to the Use of Psycholinguistics, 23 CRIMINAL L.
BuLL. 135, 137-38 (1987); Perlman, supra note 15, at 528-31; Schwarzer, supra
note 16, at 743-47; Severance, Greene & Loftus, supra note 54, at 199; Steele &
Thornburg, supra note 17, at 108-09; Taylor, Buchanan, Pryor & Strawn, supra
note 47, at 11.
215. See Steele & Thornburg, supra note 17, at 100 n.122 (first-year torts casebooks
devote 80-100 pages on causation).
216. The classic assertion that the law is often incoherent can be found in K. LLEWEi-
LYN, THE BI"MBLE BUSH 66-69 (1951). For more recent discussions of the extent
to which law is incoherent, and the political ramifications of it, see Kennedy,
Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STuD. 351, 351-54 (1973); Kress, Legal Indeterminacy,
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Even when the law is sufficiently clear that jurors could compre-
hend it if it were clearly and simply explained, why do we blame the
judge's instructions if they do not? When the jurors in the Sellars case
mistakenly convicted the defendant because they misunderstood the
law of self-defense, why do we assume the problem lies in the charge
and will therefore go away if we rewrite the pattern instructions, give
jurors written copies, or repeat the instructions several time during
trial? Focusing exclusively on the comprehensibility of the instruc-
tions misses one important point-trials are adversary proceedings in
which the parties have lawyers. One possibility in Sellars is that the
judge failed to give the jury a comprehensible instruction on the law.
The other possibility, however, is that the defendant's attorney com-
pletely neglected to make sure the jury understood the self-defense
rule and that the failure is the attorney's rather than the court's. Ex-
amining the problem of jurors' comprehension of the law as if the in-
structions were their only source of information, as other
commentators have done, is not a helpful way of approaching the
question of whether and how we need to reform our jury instruction
practices.
The suggestions for improving comprehension through better in-
structions are essentially four: rewrite instructions so they more
clearly explain the law; give the jurors preliminary instructions on the
basic issues to help them focus on what is important; repeat the in-
structions several times to make sure the jurors remember them; and
place the instructions in context. These suggestions merely duplicate
what a competent trial lawyer already does in voir dire, opening state-
ment, and closing argument.
In voir dire, competent attorneys discuss the important legal issues
to make sure that jurors understand the major points of law upon
which the case relies. The trial lawyer's task is to simplify and explain
the law, discuss the burden of proof, and question jurors about their
comprehension of and willingness to follow those legal rules.21 7 Any
juror who does not understand or is unwilling to abide by the law is
subject to challenge.2 1 8 For example, in the trial of Huey Newton for
killing a police officer, his attorney engaged in the following voir dire:
Q: As you sit there, Mr. Strauss, in your opinion, right now while you are
sitting there this minute, is Huey P. Newton guilty or not guilty?
A: Well, I don't know for sure whether he shot the officer, but the officer is
dead.
77 CALIF. L. REV. 283,295-301 (1989); Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism
and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 11-14 (1984).
217. See M. BELLI, MODERN TRiALs 796-98 (1954); 1 F. LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECH.
NIQUE § 9.73 (2d ed. 1971); Crump, Attorneys' Goals and Tactics in Voir Dire Ex-
amination, 43 TEX. B.J. 244 (1980).
218. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424-26 (1985)(jurors who are unwilling
to impose death penalty subject to challenge for cause).
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Q: [J]ust because the officer is dead, you are going to say that Huey Newton
did it; is that right?
A: Well, that's got to be proven.
Q: Now, the District Attorney ... has the burden of bringing some evidence in
... before anything can happen. Do you understand that?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, if the District Attorney does not produce any evidence at all, the man
is not guilty. Isn't that correct?
A: That's right.
[Q: So, as] Huey Newton sits here next to me now, in your opinion is he abso-
lutely innocent?
A: Yes.
Q: But you don't believe it, do you?
A: No.
The Court: Challenge is allowed.2 19
In opening statements, trial lawyers will again outline the legal ba-
ses for their claims and defenses and focus the jury's attention on the
important legal issues so jurors will be able to make better sense out
of the evidence that will follow.220 Here, the lawyer's task is to tell
the jury in plain, ordinary language the legal basis for the complaint
and answer and to explain the general nature of the dispute the jury
will have to solve.221 For example:
The prosecution has charged Philip Green with murder;, that is, they say he
intentionally killed the deceased, planned it in advance, knowing what he was
doing. We have an honest defense. We do not deny that Phil Green caused
the death of the deceased. But he was not responsible for this act. At the time
the deceased was killed, Phil Green did not know what he was doing or that
what he was doing was wrong. He had been driven crazy with fear of the
deceased. 2 22
In closing arguments, competent trial practitioners spend consider-
able time discussing relevant jury instructions. In the literature on
trial techniques, it has always been assumed that it is the attorneys'
responsibility to clearly explain the elements of the law. If instruc-
tions bear repeating, require simplification or being put into writing,
or have to be placed into context, the lawyers have the opportunity
and obligation to do this in summation. It is not the exclusive province
of the trial judge.
Initially, the attorneys' task is to read relevant instructions to the
jury, explain which issues are contested, and make sure the jurors un-
derstand them.223 Difficult instructions, such as burden of proof and
219. A. GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 539-44 (1975).
220. See 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRUMNAL JUSTICE 3-5.5, 4-7.4 (2d ed. 1980).
221. F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATT, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES FOR CRIMNAL TRIALS 118
(1971).
222. J. TANFORD, THE TRIAL PROCESS: LAw, TACTICS AN ETHICS 279-80 (1983).
223. E. IMWINKELREID, HANDBOOK FOR THE TRIAL OF CONTRACT LAwsUIS 358 (1981);
T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 311, 317-18 (1980); J. TANFORD,
supra note 222, at 156-59.
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circumstantial evidence, should be explained and illustrated with
analogies to every-day life.2 For example, every neophyte trial law-
yer knows how to illustrate burdens of proof by demonstrating with
his or her hands how far the scales of justice must tip.225 The lawyer
also should place the instructions in the context of the facts of the
case. For example, if counsel is arguing that a particular witness
should not be believed because he was impeached, the lawyer should
at that point refer to the instruction that prior inconsistent statements
can be used to evaluate credibility.226
Thus, by the time the court reads the final jury charge, all impor-
tant legal issues should have been explained to the jury in simplified
language three times by each side. If the lawyers were minimally
competent, the jury will have been alerted at the beginning to the im-
portant issues and jurors who cannot comprehend the law will have
been removed. In argument, the law will have been placed in the con-
text of the facts of the case and probably written in outline form on a
chalkboard. Therefore, most of the suggestions by psycholinguists
merely duplicate what a competent trial attorney already does.227
Although rewriting and simplifying instructions would certainly be an
improvement, its benefits are overstated. In conjunction with the at-
torneys' performances, it would add little to the process of educating
jurors about the law.
However, in some jurisdictions, rules of trial procedure do not per-
mit the attorneys to do all these things. Citing the need for efficiency
and the fear that attorneys will misstate the law, some states prevent
attorneys from fulfilling this educational role in voir dire and opening
statement. Although most jurisdictions permit attorneys in voir dire
to inquire into prospective jurors' understanding of and willingness to
abide by law,228 some judges prohibit such inquiries because of the
fear that attorneys will brainwash jurors into believing erroneous
224. T. MAUET, supra note 223, at 299; McElbaney, Analogies in Final Argument, LITI-
GATION, Winter 1980, at 37.
225. See . McCULLOUGH & J. UNDERWOOD, CIVIL TRIAL MANuAL 655-56 (2d ed. 1980).
226. T. MAUET, supra note 223, at 297-98, 317-18.
227. See Crump, supra note 217, at 244:
When done by skillful lawyers on both sides, this dialectic may lead
to a better understanding by the jury of the [legal] concepts involved.
When the skill of the lawyers is not balanced, however, the law can be
lopsided. If one or both lawyers are incompetent, the entire premise that
fair trials result from adversary presentations is cast into doubt. In such
situations, justice is not likely to be restored simply by improving the
quality of the jury instructions.
228. See Tanford, supra note 167, at 640 (permissible to ask about major issues in cases
such as insanity or alibi defenses, narcotics, gambling, or obscenity charges, disin-
heritance, intra-family torts, child abuse, strict liability, etc). The leading case is
People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 628 P.2d 869 (1981).
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statements of the law. Indeed, such irrational229 fears of attorney
abuse have caused some jurisdictions to prohibit any meaningful in-
volvement in voir dire by the parties.230 Similarly, some jurisdictions
prohibit discussion of law in opening statement under the outdated
notion that the jurors may only receive the law from the court.231
Like the proverbial baby thrown out with the bathwater, courts sacri-
fice the chances of improved comprehension of law to guard against a
trivial threat of occasional abuses by attorneys.
If we really want to reform the rules of trial procedure in a way
likely to increase jurors' comprehension of their instructions, the bet-
ter solution is to allow the parties to fully perform their adversary
function. Attorneys should be allowed to participate meaningfully in
voir dire and to discuss the legal issues in opening statement. They
should be given enough time in closing arguments to fully discuss the
law and its ramifications.23 2 Ultimately, this is likely to be a more
effective and efficient way of assuring that jurors are fully informed
about the law and how it applies to the case than trying to rewrite
simple, neutral instructions.23 3
B. Abandoning Admonitions
The legal literature's focus on rewriting charging instructions has
diverted attention from the more difficult problem of admonitions.23 4
Admonishing jurors is an ineffective way to prevent harm from im-
proper evidence. Indeed, research suggests that admonitions tend to
aggravate the very harm they are intended to reduce. The psychologi-
cal literature has offered theoretical explanations of why admonitions
do not work but has not offered an alternative solution. Nor has any
specific proposal for meaningful reform of the law sanctioning
admonitions appeared in the law reviews.235 I now offer one, on the
229. The fears are irrational because they overlook that there is an attorney on the
other side who can object, and a judge who can correct, any misstatements of the
law.
230. See Tanford, supra note 167, at 628-29 (non-participation is common in federal
courts).
231. See id. at 650-51.
232. See Tanford, Closing Argument Procedure, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 47, 72-73
(1986) (reviewing cases imposing time limits as short as five to ten minutes).
233. See generally NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 917-18
(1982)(court may look to arguments as well as instructions to determine if jury
was properly informed about scope of damages).
234. See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 16, at 749-50, 754 (apparently unaware of the psy-
chological literature on the subject, discusses benefits of rewriting instructions
but suggests that curative admonitions should be given).
235. In fact, with the exception of a few student notes, nothing appears to have been
published in the law reviews on admonitions since Broeder, supra note 1, and
Kalven, supra note 3, announced the findings of the Chicago Jury Project in the
1950's. See Note, supra note 93 (limiting instructions are ineffective when evi-
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assumption that courts are serious about minimizing the harm associ-
ated with inadmissible and limited-admissibility evidence.23 6
1. In the Trial Court
First, courts must accept that admonitions do not work and may be
counterproductive. The assumption that they are effective by them-
selves should be replaced with the recognition that instructions inter-
act with the adversary system. The only way in which an admonition
might help offset the prejudicial effect of improper evidence is if the
parties discuss and explain the problem in their arguments to the jury.
Therefore, at the trial court level, admonitions should not be given
unless requested by an affected party who wants to incorporate it into
its argument.
To demonstrate how this approach would work, reconsider the two
Supreme Court cases on instructing the jury to disregard a defendant's
refusal to testify. In Carter v. Kentucky,237 the defense attorney re-
quested the instruction. If the attorney were competent, he would not
have done so unless he also discussed the possibility of his client's si-
lence in voir dire, alerted the jury to their duty not to hold it against
him in opening statement, and spent time in closing argument making
sure the jury understood the fifth amendment. Under these circum-
stances, the defendant himself focuses the jury's attention on his si-
lence. An admonition probably will do no additional harm and will
reinforce the attorney's argument. The trial judge should have given
it.
On the other hand, in Lakeside v. Oregon,23 8 the defense attorney
adopted a different strategy. He decided not to emphasize his client's
silence. He presumably did not discuss it in voir dire, opening state-
ment, or closing argument. Under these circumstances, the judge's de-
cision to nullify the defense strategy and alert the jury to the
dence of other crimes is introduced); Note, supra note 75, at 614-15 (instructions
to disregard defendant's silence are probably somewhat effective); Note, To Take
the Stand or Not to Take the Stand: the Dilemma of the Defendant With a Crimi-
nal Record, 4 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 215,218 (1968)(most attorneys and many
judges think limiting instructions are ineffective); Note, Eyewitness Identfca-
tion Testimony and the Need for Cautionary Jury Instructions, 60 WAsH. U.L.Q.
1387, 1429-30 (1983)(conceding limiting instructions are problematic, but arguing
that they must work, or why else would courts rely on them?).
236. In criminal cases, some appellate judges appear to want to maximize convictions
of both the innocent and guilty, in order to assure that the courts further a crime
control strategy. See Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court- An Exami-
nation of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 436,
437-38 (1980)(suggesting this is the goal of the conservative Burger Court). Such
judges might want to keep using admonitions for the very reason that they tend
to aggravate the prejudice to the defendant.
237. 450 U.S. 288 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 114-18.
238. 435 U.S. 333 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 110-13.
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defendant's silence by giving an admonition probably caused the in-
creased harmful effect seen in many experiments. The trial judge
should not have given the instruction and the Court's decision to ap-
prove the procedure is wrong.
What should the trial judge in Lakeside have done instead? No
clear answer is found in the psychology literature. However, a tenta-
tive solution can be pieced together from a variety of sources. The
first principle for judges trying to minimi ze the damage caused by im-
proper information should be the same as for physicians deciding how
to treat an injury: Do no harm.23 9 The presumption should be that,
because of the danger, no admonition should be given even if asked for
by an affected attorney. No physician lets an ignorant patient pre-
scribe remedies for his own illness. By the same token, no judge
should give a dangerous admonition merely upon request. Instead, the
instruction should be given only if the att6rney seems aware of their
side effects but wants the instruction as part of a strategy to try to deal
with it through education and reasoning with the jurors.
Instead of admonishing jurors, it may be more helpful for the trial
judge to instruct the jury at the beginning of trial that they are to
disregard evidence to which an objection is sustained, and that any
evidence of a defendant's criminal record may not be considered as
evidence of guilt. Psychologists have shown that this kind of fore-
warning of subjects about upcoming prejudicial information can re-
duce their susceptibility to it.240 Then, during voir dire, before they
hear any evidence, jurors should be interrogated about these two rules
and asked to promise to obey them. Psychologists also have demon-
strated that obtaining a public commitment from a person to act in a
certain way increases the likelihood that the person will in fact engage
in the desired behavior.241 During the trial itself, objections should be
sustained but no admonition given.2 42 Finally, in her concluding
239. Cf. Hippocrates, The Physician's Oath, in J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QuOTATIONS 79
(15th ed. 1980)("I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and
judgment, but never with a view to injury and wrongdoing, I will abstain from all
intentional wrongdoing and harm").
240. See McGuire, Inducing Resistance to Persuasion, in 1 ADVANCEs IN ExPEmImN-
TAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 191 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1964); Petty & Cacioppo, Fore-
warning, Cognitive Responding, and Resistance to Persuasion, 35 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 645 (1977).
241. McGuire, Attitudes and Attitude Change, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
293 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 3d ed. 1985); Pallak, Cook & Sullivan, Commit-
ment and Energy Conservation, in 1 APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY ANN. 235 (1981).
See generally C. KIESLER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COMMITMENT (1971)(broad theo-
retical overview).
242. Cf. Caretta & Moreland, The Direct and Indirect Effects of Inadmissible Evi-
dence, 13 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 291, 298-99 (1983)(judge's ruling evidence
inadmissible without admonition reduced jurors' use of that evidence).
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charge, the judge should repeat the general instruction if requested.2 4 3
2. On Appeal
Obviously, once courts recognize that admonitions do not work, ap-
pellate courts will need to modify or abandon the cured error doctrine.
In its present form, this doctrine allows appellate courts to avoid re-
viewing claims of prejudice at trial whenever the judge admonished
the jury,24 4 even though such instructions by themselves are ineffec-
tive. The doctrine should be replaced with one that is based more on
the conduct of the attorneys than of the judge. If the risk of prejudice
results from a party's own decision, as in the case of a defendant who
elects not to testify, then the party should be expected to deal with it
through voir dire and argument. If the party does so, the error should
be deemed cured;24 5 if they fail to do so, the error is invited.2m Rever-
sal is appropriate only if counsel provided ineffective assistance. 247 On
the other hand, if prejudice results from an opponent's conduct, the
courts should use the harmless error test. The defendant should be
entitled to a new trial unless the prejudice is minor or the other evi-
dence overwhelming. Admonitions become irrelevant to this equation
because they have no ameliorative effect.
Courts also should abandon that part of the procedural default doc-
trine that forces the lawyer to request an admonition as a prerequisite
to appeal.24 The existing rule effectively insulates from review errors
with a significant probability of having affected the verdict. If the at-
torney requests and receives an instruction, the error is deemed cured;
however, if the attorney does not request the instruction, the error is
waived. In place of this nonsensical doctrine, courts can use the more
common default rule based on failure to object: as long as the attor-
ney objects to improper evidence, the issue is preserved for appeal. 249
243. Wolf & Montgomery, supra note 4, at 216, found some support for this approach,
although they did not specifically test for it.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 166-73.
245. Cf. Tanford, supra note 167, at 706 (many courts recognize a variation of the cured
error doctrine based on the attorneys' conduct).
246. See id. at 709-fU (discussion of invited error rule). But cf. Belsky, The Retaliation
Doctrine: Promoting Forensic Misconduct, 50 ALB. L. REV. 763, 776-99 (1986)
(criticizing invited error doctrine).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 201-07.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 195-200.
249. See Tanford, supra note 167, at 702-06. Under the usual default rule, it is not
considered a waiver of the claim if the attorney both objects and tries to reduce
the damaging effect of improper evidence through argument. E.g., State v.
Ashley, 616 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Lockhart v. Robbins, 386 So. 2d 424
(Ala. 1980); Fullerton v. Robson, 61 Ill. App. 3d 93, 377 N.E.2d 1044 (1978).
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3. The Problem That Won't Go Away: The Defendant's
Criminal Record
Finally, courts will have to reconsider the cavalier way in which
they admit evidence of a defendant's prior criminal record. Currently,
despite almost universal criticism of the practice by legal scholars,250
courts routinely admit evidence of other crimes on the assumption
that a limiting instruction will prevent prejudice to the defendant. 251
Courts must accept the fact that this is not so. When other crimes are
used against the defendant-at least when they are similar to the
crime charged - there is an inevitable spillover effect. Limiting in-
structions may only make the situation worse.25 2
The convenient fiction that jurors obey their admonitions has ena-
bled legal policy-makers to avoid the difficult political decision of
whether trials should only determine guilt of the offense charged or
whether they should be the vehicle for getting criminals off the streets
with a semblance of legitimacy.25 3 If trials are supposed to determine
guilt only for the present charge, then rule 404(b) should be changed.
The rule should generally prohibit the introduction of any evidence
that the defendant was involved in similar criminal activity regardless
of the reason why the prosecutor is offering it.254 Individual excep-
tions, such as proving the defendant's involvement in other identical
crimes to establish identity, should be carefully reconsidered, recog-
nizing that every exception increases the likelihood that an otherwise
innocent defendant will be found guilty.
VI. CONCLUSION
Experimental research by psychologists has revealed a number of
substantial problems with the way courts use jury instructions.
Charging instructions that are drafted by lawyers and read once tend
to be difficult for jurors to understand. Comprehension would be im-
proved by rewriting instructions according to psycholinguistic princi-
ples, giving preliminary instructions, repeating important ones several
250. E.g., Imwinkelreid, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The
Threat to the Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REv. 1465,1470-
71 (1985); Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts
Evidence, 66 IowA L. REv. 777 (1981); Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove
Conduct- Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 845
(1982).
251. See supra text accompanying notes 183-94.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 100-03.
253. See generally Tanford, A Political-choice Approach to Limiting Prejudicial Evi-
dence, 64 IND. L.J. 831, 859-71 (1989)(courts treat the problem of prejudicial evi-
dence generally in a way that masks the true political nature of the decisions).
254. A similar argument can be made for changing FED. R. EVID. 411 to flatly prohibit
proof of insurance, rather than allow it to show agency, ownership, control, or
witness bias.
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times, and placing abstract instructions in the context of the facts of
the case. Admonitions are not only misunderstood but may provoke
jurors into doing the opposite of what they are told.
Despite this research, courts continue to presume that jurors un-
derstand and obey their instructions. With a few exceptions, the
states have neither rewritten their pattern instructions to make them
more comprehensible nor required preliminary or repeated instruc-
tions. They also continue to recommend that trial judges respond to
prejudicial evidence with admonitions. On appeal, courts adhere to
the nonsensical cured error doctrine that denies a new trial when prej-
udicial evidence is made even more damaging by the judge's instruc-
tions. Even more absurd are the procedural default and ineffective
assistance of counsel rules that effectively require the attorney to ask
for an admonition that will only worsen the case against her client.
Previous proposals for law reform have centered on the need to
rewrite pattern instructions and revise jury charge procedures so that
important instructions are repeated more than once. Such proposals
overlook the fact that competent trial attorneys routinely undertake
the tasks of explaining the law, making sure jurors understand its im-
portant elements, and removing jurors who will not abide by their in-
structions. Thus, improving the judge's delivery of the basic charge is
likely to have little net effect in improving the trial system.
This Article proposes that more meaningful reforms can be made if
we concentrate on admonitions and rules of law based on the errone-
ous assumption that it is possible to prevent misuse of evidence merely
with an instruction. At trial, the litigants probably would receive
fairer trials if judges stopped using admonitions and, instead, gave pre-
liminary instructions to ignore evidence ruled inadmissible. On ap-
peal, the cured error doctrine should be abandoned because it is based
on a faulty premise. The procedural default rule requiring parties to
ask for admonitions should be replaced with one that merely requires
them to object. Perhaps most importantly, abandoning the convenient
fiction that admonitions work will compel courts to face up to the dif-
ficult task of deciding whether to admit evidence that has both proba-
tive and prejudicial qualities. Decisions based on empirically correct
assumptions about juror behavior may be more difficult, but ulti-
mately will make the jury trial system operate more coherently.
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